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INTRODUCTION
The creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL or the
Court) in early 2002 generated high expectations within the international
community.' The SCSL was generally deemed to herald a new model or
benchmark for the assessment of future ad hoc international criminal
courts.! As the Court completes the trial of former Liberian President
Charles Taylor in The Hague-its last-nine years later, this Article of-
fers an early and broad assessment of whether it has fulfilled its promise.
More specifically, this Article examines whether the SCSL has
achieved, or more accurately-because its trials are still ongoing-
whether it is achieving justice. I use the term justice in the ordinary
sense, referring to whether the Court has justly or fairly treated the ac-
cused during the proceedings it has carried out. This approach is justified
for three main reasons. First, dispensing credible justice on behalf of
Sierra Leonean victims of conflict is a noble goal that was the raison
I. See, e.g., Stuart Beresford & A.S. Muller, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: An
Initial Comment, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 635 (2001) (maintaining optimism regarding the
Court despite the numerous hurdles facing it); Robert Cryer, A "Special Court" for Sierra
Leone, 50 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 435 (2001) (comparing the origins of the Court relative to
other attempts at creating similar institutions); Nicole Fritz & Alison Smith, Current Apathy
for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
391 (2001) (claiming that the Court, by virtue of its relationship with the United Nations, will
be perceived as more legitimate than purely domestic courts); Micaela Frulli, The Special
Court for Sierra Leone: Some Preliminary Comments, 11 E.J.I.L. 857, 869 (2000) ("[T]he
establishment of the Special Court represents another positive step in the struggle against
impunity."); Melron C. Nicol-Wilson, Accountability for Human Rights Abuses: The United
Nations'Special Court for Sierra Leone, AUSTL. INT'L L.J. 159, 175 (2001) ("The importance
of establishing the Special Court is unquestionable and Sierra Leoneans and the international
community are anxious to see a viable and effective court functioning as soon as possible.");
Celina Schocken, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and Recommendations, 20
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 436 (2002) (expressing optimism in the Court when compared to the
International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal of
Yugoslavia (ICTY)).
2. See Independent Expert, Report on the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 134
(Dec. 12, 2006) (Antonio Cassese) ("[Tlhe Special Court has in some respects made much
headway, establishing a new benchmark for international criminal justice. On the other hand,
the Court has also experienced a number of challenges and setbacks . . .").
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d'etre for the SCSL's creation. Second, since the Court is an interna-
tional tribunal entrusted with such a sacred mandate and whose creation
and functioning was supported by many states from around the world, it
seems only fair to hold it to the high international fair trial standards that
its statute claims to espouse. Third, the SCSL's success was, from its
founding, predicated on the idea that it would not only dispense justice
but that it would be seen to do so and contribute to laying a firm struc-
tural foundation for lasting peace and national reconciliation in post-
conflict Sierra Leone. An inevitable question then is whether it has met
that expectation.
The Article is divided into four parts. Part I examines the travaux
prdparatoires, or documentary history, of the Court to discern the tribu-
nal's intended role in order to set the stage for the subsequent analysis. I
focus on the views of Sierra Leone and the United Nations during the
formal discussions and negotiations preceding the SCSL's establishment.
Part H1 provides some necessary background. Towards that end, I briefly
highlight the three main trials that the Court has completed as well as the
current status of its fourth and, by all indications, last trial, that of former
Liberian President Charles Taylor.
In Part III, I examine some limitations relating to the SCSL from a
Sierra Leonean perspective, starting with the Prosecutor's selection of
cases. I question the excessively narrow manner in which he framed and
applied the Court's greatest responsibility personal jurisdiction. In this
regard, I ask who was prosecuted, who was not prosecuted, and why or
why not. Though I do not purport to have all the answers, my analysis
does reveal a curious, inverse, and unexpected result: over-inclusiveness
with respect to those who were actually prosecuted and under-
inclusiveness in relation to those who were not. In seeking to understand
this outcome, I suggest that the SCSL's volatile donations-based funding
structure severely limited the number of cases brought by the Prosecu-
tion. Perhaps worse, it also negatively impacted the funding and other
types of support provided for the accused and their defense.
Part IV of the Article critically assesses how well the Court has done
in achieving the tripartite goals of its founders to help bring justice, re-
store peace, and promote national reconciliation in Sierra Leone. Finally,
in the Conclusion, I make some tentative observations about the overall
fairness of the trials and the quality of justice thus far rendered by the
SCSL.
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1. THE INTENDED ROLE OF THE SPECIAL
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
The role of the SCSL is best discerned through examination of the
original objectives of those who created it. The founders of the Court
were the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) and the U.N. Security
Council (Security Council). The government initiated the processes that
ultimately led to the establishment of the SCSL, while the Security
Council endorsed the idea and authorized its implementation by Secre-
tary-General Kofi Annan. Each of their respective roles will be discussed
in the subsections that follow.
A. Sierra Leone's Request for UN. Support for a Special Tribunal
On June 12, 2000, Sierra Leonean President Alhaji Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah wrote to the President of the Security Council requesting sup-
port from the United Nations and the rest of the international community
in establishing a "special court for Sierra Leone."3 In his letter, the Afri-
can leader, whose nation was at that point caught up in a war fueled by a
lust for so-called "conflict" or "blood diamonds,'" described the need for
a "strong court in order to bring and maintain peace and security" to his
country and the sub-region. He advocated for a "strong and credible
court" that would prosecute those leaders of the rebel Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) who had planned and executed a brutal, decade long
civil war in which ordinary civilians were routinely targeted, and in
which about 500 U.N. peacekeepers had, at one point, been taken hos-
6
tage.
The Sierra Leonean leader made a strong case for international sup-
port. He explained that approximately ten years of indiscriminate
murder, amputations, abductions, and abuse of civilians-especially girls
and women who were used as sex slaves-amply demonstrated why the
3. President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, Annex to the Letter dated Aug. 9, 2000
from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/786 (Aug. 10, 2000) [hereinafter Kabbah
Letter to UNSC].
4. See generally JOHN L. HIRSCH, SIERRA LEONE: DIAMONDS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
DEMOCRACY (2001); IAN SMILLIE, LANSANA GBERIE & RALPH HAZLETON, THE HEART OF
THE MATTER: SIERRA LEONE, DIAMONDS & HUMAN SECURITY 1-3 (2000); GLOBAL WITNESS,
EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED: MONITORING THE INTEGRATED DIAMOND MANAGE-
MENT PROGRAM'S DIAMOND TRACKING SYSTEM IN SIERRA LEONE (2006) (reporting on a
diamond tracking initiative for mining cooperatives in Sierra Leone); J. Andrew Grant, Dia-
monds, Foreign Aid and the Uncertain Prospects for Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Sierra
Leone, 94 ROUND TABLE, 443, 451-54 (2005).
5. Kabbah Letter to UNSC, supra note 3, at 2.
6. Id.
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RUF's reign of terror in his country had led to one of the worst civil con-
flicts in recorded history.! His government's experience dealing with the
rebels over the failed Lom6 Peace Agreement confirmed that it was "on-
ly by bringing the RUF leadership and their collaborators to justice ...
that peace and national reconciliation and the strengthening of democ-
racy" would be restored to Sierra Leone.9 Furthermore, according to
President Kabbah, the types of crimes that the RUF leadership and their
accomplices had committed should be "of concern to all persons in the
world, as they greatly diminish respect for international law and for the
most basic human rights."'o
He explained that, but for international support, Sierra Leone would
be unable to dispense credible justice on behalf of the victims. The coun-
try simply lacked the resources, expertise, and domestic legislation
necessary for such trials." This was particularly true given its decimated
legal and judicial infrastructure and the widespread nature and extent of
12the crimes.
Ultimately, President Kabbah envisioned a "court that will meet in-
ternational standards for the trial of criminal cases while at the same
time having a mandate to administer a blend of international and domes-
tic Sierra Leonean law on Sierra Leonean soil."
B. The Security Council Endorses Sierra Leone's Request
Security Council Resolution 1315, adopted on August 14, 2000, set
forth the basic blueprint for the Court, drawing on the initial framework
that President Kabbah proposed.14 It reflects two underlying purposes
that have remained central to the SCSL's mission throughout its exis-
tence.
First, the resolution affirmed the deep desire of the GoSL and the
Security Council to ensure the prosecution of those who had committed
7. See id. For commentary on the conflict in Sierra Leone, see Daniel J. Macaluso,
Absolute and Free Pardon: The Effect of the Amnesty Provision in the Lome Peace Agreement
on the Jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 347, 347-48
(describing the basic path of negotiations, and the overall purpose of the Lom6 Peace Agree-
ment, which offered amnesty in exchange for ceasefire).
8. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/1999/777/Annex (July 12, 1999) [hereinafter Lom6
Agreement].
9. Kabbah Letter to UNSC, supra note 3, at 2.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
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serious crimes in Sierra Leone based on "international standards of
justice, fairness and due process of law."" Paragraph 6 of the Preamble
noted "the importance of compliance with international humanitarian
law" and stressed the need to uphold the principle of individual criminal
responsibility for those who violate its norms."' President Kabbah's goal
of "bringing justice" 7 and ending impunity was underscored by the Se-
curity Council's express determination to "exert every effort"" to bring
those individuals responsible for heinous crimes to justice.
Second, the resolution captured the parties' conviction that in the
particular circumstances of Sierra Leone a "credible system of justice
and accountability" would not only help "end impunity" for the grave
offences that were committed there, but would also contribute to "lasting
peace" and "national reconciliation."'9 Resolution 1315 emphasized the
"negative impact of the security situation on the administration of justice
in Sierra Leone and the pressing need for international cooperation to
assist in strengthening the judicial system."20 The Security Council then
highlighted the important contribution that the international community
can make in expediting that process, as well as to the challenge of
"bringing justice and reconciliation to Sierra Leone and the region."2'
President Kabbah had requested a tribunal created under the "Secu-
rity Council's authority."22 He felt that this would give it strong
enforcement powers," including the ability to require states to cooperate
with it consistent with the binding nature of decisions taken for the
maintenance of collective peace and security under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter.24 Though it rejected that request," the Security Council did
reiterate, in the final preambulary paragraph of the resolution, that the
15. Id. at I (emphasis added).
16. Id.
17. Kabbah Letter to UNSC, supra note 3, at 2.
18. S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 14, at 1.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id.
22. Kabbah Letter to UNSC, supra note 3, at 4.
23. Id.
24. U.N. Charter arts. 39-51 (empowering the Security Council to undertake actions
respecting threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, which has been
invoked, in particular that given by Article 41, to create international tribunals).
25. Compare Kabbah Letter to UNSC, supra note 3, at 4 (requesting that the Security
Council create a tribunal for Sierra Leone under its Chapter VII authority), with S.C. Res.
1315, supra note 14, at 2 (recommending that a tribunal be created by an agreement between
the Secretary-General and Sierra Leone and omitting any recommendation to create a court
under the Security Council's Chapter VII authority).
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Sierra Leone situation "continues to constitute a threat to international
peace and security in the region. 
The parties sought to achieve the above objectives through the estab-
lishment of a new, efficient, and focused ad hoc tribunal. Though this
point has been largely missed in the literature, the Kabbah request and
the subsequent consultations with relevant stakeholders in Sierra Leone
revealed a "clear preference . . . for a national court with a strong inter-
national component in all its organs (judges, prosecutors, defence
counsel and support staff), and for international assistance in funding,
equipment and legal expertise."27 Though the national courts were clearly
underfunded and understaffed, the Sierra Leonean lawyers and judges
that were consulted suggested that the local justice system was capable
of holding fair trials. However, the United Nations preferred an interna-
tional court with strong national elements. This was partly because of the
concern that integrating the tribunal into the national justice system im-
plied that the death penalty could apply to those convicted.28
Despite these and other important differences (for example the con-
troversy regarding whether child soldiers ought to be prosecuted) Sierra
Leonean and U.N. officials quickly reached agreement on the core as-
pects of the Court. Indeed, the main negotiations between the legal
representatives of the parties, which took place first in the United States
and then Sierra Leone, concluded in less than a week in September
2000.29
C. U.N. -Sierra Leone Agreement and Key Features
of SCSL Jurisdiction
The final version of the bilateral agreement, to which a statute was
annexed, was signed in Freetown, the Sierra Leonean capital, on Janu-
ary 16, 2002.30 It set out the legal framework for a mixed court, featuring
26. S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 14, at 2.
27. U.N. Secretary-General, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Na-
tions Mission in Sierra Leone, 9, U.N. Doc. S/2000/751 (July 31, 2000).
28. Id. 1 10 (noting that the U.N. and many of its member states would oppose a legal
process involving application of the death penalty). In a later report, the Secretary-General
conceded that it would require considerable persuasion to convince Sierra Leoneans, who had
suffered atrocities that few societies had experienced, that "exclusion of the death penalty and
its replacement by imprisonment is not an 'acquittal' of the accused, but an imposition of a
more humane punishment." U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 7, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000)
[hereinafter UNSG Report].
29. UNSG Report, supra note 28, U 5-6.
30. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137 [herein-
after U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement].
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both local and international elements, while attempting to account for
some of the experiences of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY/ICTR). The constitutive
instruments of the SCSL elaborated many novel features that were
intended to reflect the specifics of the country's conflict and the brutal
nature of the crimes perpetrated.'
As such, the Court was to be independent of Sierra Leonean courts
as well as of the United Nations." Significantly, unlike the ICTY and
ICTR, which were geographically divorced from their crime bases, the
SCSL was to be located in the "theater of conflict."" It was also to be
financed through voluntary contributions from U.N. member states
rather than as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council.' The Secre-
tary-General strenuously objected to this, warning presciently that such a
volatile funding structure was neither viable nor sustainable." One of the
compromises devised to assuage him was the creation of a Management
Committee comprised of interested third party countries to assist the
Court's fundraising efforts while providing advice, policy direction, and
overall operational oversight. As this Article will show, the decision to
use donations to fund this important justice initiative proved to be a bane
to the operations and ultimate legacy of the SCSL.
31. UNSG Report, supra note 28, 11. For the novel features of the SCSL, see Charles
Chernor Jalloh, The Contribution of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to the Development of
International Law, 15 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 165, 175-76 (2007) [hereinafter Jalloh, The
Contribution of the SCSL].
32. UNSG Report, supra note 28, 19. See Prosecutor v. Gbao, Case No. SCLS-04-15-
PT, Decision on Preliminary Motion on the Invalidity of the Agreement Between the United
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of the Special
Court (May 25, 2004), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ltoQC6w%2fLME%
3d&tabid=195.
33. Vincent 0. Nmehielle & Charles Chernor Jalloh, The Legacy of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone, 30 FLETCHER F WORLD AFF. 107, 108 (2006) [hereinafter Nmehielle &
Jalloh, Legacy of the SCSL].
34. As an organ of the Security Council, the Court would be entitled to a budget borne
in accordance with Article 17 of the U.N. Charter. In contrast to the ICTY and ICTR, the
SCSL would be financed solely through voluntary contributions of states. This was mostly
because the main sponsor of the SCSL project at its creation, the United States (which intro-
duced the draft of what became S.C. Res. 1315) did not want to be saddled with paying for it.
See also U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from the Secretary-General ad-
dressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/40 (Jan. 12, 2001).
35. The Secretary-General cited legal, practical, and moral reasons why donations
should not be used to fund the Court. For more on this warning, which proved to be prescient,
see the discussion in UNSG Report, supra note 28, 68-72.
36. U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 30, art. 7 (describing the functions of the
Management Committee and the "understanding of the Parties that interested States may wish
to establish a management committee to assist the Special Court in obtaining adequate fund-
ing").
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Security Council Resolution 1315 had set forth a vision of the "effi-
cient, independent and impartial functioning of the special court."" To
reach those goals, and to resolve some of the pressures felt by the other
tribunals, the Court's personal jurisdiction was circumscribed, firstly, to
prosecutions of only those individuals bearing the "greatest responsibil-
ity""3 for the crimes perpetrated and, secondly, to offenses committed
after November 30, 1996. It was felt that initiating jurisdiction from
March 23, 1991, when the Sierra Leonean conflict began, would over-
burden the Prosecution and drag out the SCSL's proceedings.
The Statute of the Court conferred ratione materiae jurisdiction for
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law. It also included certain Sierra Leonean
crimes committed on national territory.4 These concerned the abuse of
children under fourteen years old4' and the offense of arson.42 The juris-
diction over national offences was expressly included at the Kabbah
Government's request to help foster a sense of local ownership of the
SCSL and its processes; to allow greater flexibility to the Prosecutor to
pick and choose which of national and or international offences to
charge suspects with; and finally, to cast a wider net to ensure that the
leaders responsible for the atrocities would not escape punishment.43 But,
in practice, the national crimes were never used because of a prosecuto-
rial policy decision." Whatever law was to be used, the Court was to
focus on prosecuting the top echelon responsible for the atrocities, in
particular, "those leaders who had threatened the establishment of and
implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone."45
37. S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 14, 8(b).
38. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, 1 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 145.
39. UNSG Report, supra note 28, IN 21-28.
40. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145,
arts. 2 (crimes against humanity), 3 (war crimes), and 4 (other serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law).
41. Id. art. 5(a)(i-iii) (citing Prevention of Cruelty to Children (1926) Cap. (31) (Sierra
Leone)).
42. Id. art. 5(b)(i-iii) (citing Malicious Damage Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 97 (U.K.)).
43. Kabbah Letter to UNSC, supra note 3, at 3.
44. Jalloh, The Contribution of the SCSL, supra note 31, at 173. On the other hand, it
could be argued that this was a wise decision in the circumstances because it avoided further
debates about the legality of prosecuting domestic crimes given the uncertainty of the blanket
amnesty that had been given to all combatants, including the rebels. It also avoids dealing with
complications arising from the use of national law, including the lack of access to case reports
of national decisions.
45. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 145. For a discussion of the temporal and personal jurisdiction of the SCSL, see
UNSG Report, supra note 28, 121-31. See also Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Special Court for
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The agreement (and annexed statute) creating the SCSL formally
entered into force on April 12, 2002 after both the Government of Sierra
Leone and the United Nations completed their respective formalities
required for its implementation 46 The Court was thereafter built in
Freetown in the rather extreme circumstances of a war-weary capital city
with almost zero infrastructure: no electricity, no phones, and no running
water. Regrettably, the "poor state" of the judiciary, the eroded rule of
law, and the lack of accountability-which had contributed to the
conflict in the first place-continued to plague the country well beyond
2002.47
II. BACKGROUND TO THE CASES PROSECUTED BEFORE THE
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
Despite the serious challenges of building a new court from the
ground up in such a difficult post-conflict context characterized by atroc-
ity crimes,48 the SCSL overcame its slow start and went on to
successfully try eight individuals in what became known as the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), 4 9 RUF,s0 and Civil Defense
Sierra Leone: Conceptual Concerns and Alternatives, I AFR. HuM. RTs. L.J. 107, 115-16
(2001) (reviewing various critiques of this limited temporal jurisdiction).
46. See U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 30, art. 21 ("The present Agreement
shall enter into force on the day after both Parties have notified each other in writing that the
legal requirements for entry into force have been complied with."); Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case
No. SCSL-04-14-PT-035-Hl, Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction, 1[44
(Mar. 13, 2004), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-clL%2bJhyJ66Y%3d&tabid
=193.
47. Nmehielle & Jalloh, Legacy of the SCSL, supra note 33, at 109.
48. PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, FIRST ANNUAL REP. OF
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE FOR THE PERIOD 2 DEC. 2002-1
DEC. 2003, 15, 19, 22, 31 (2003) (discussing the challenges and security difficulties of setting
up the Prosecutor's office and entire court from scratch); David M. Crane, International Crim-
inal Tribunals in the 21st Century: Terrorists, Warlords, and Thugs, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
505, 505, 515 (2006) [hereinafter Crane, Terrorists, Warlords, and Thugs] (describing unrest
and the absence of the rule of law at the time of the Court's establishment).
49. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Judgment
(Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsBrimaKamaraandKanuAFRCCase/
AppealJudgment/tabid/216/Default.aspx [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Brima Appeals Judgment];
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment (June 20,
2007), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=EqikfVSpLWM=&tabid=106 [hereinaf-
ter Prosecutor v. Brima Trial Judgment].
50. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment (Mar. 2,
2009), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=buPKI wx%2bWSo%3d&tabid=215
[hereinafter Prosecutor v. Sesay Trial Judgment]. See also Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon &
Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.sc-sI.org/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-CGgVJRfNF7M%3d&tabid=218 [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Sesay
Appeals Judgment].
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Forces (CDF)" trials. Though the shorthand used for the cases was sug-
gestive, the organizations were not formally indicted.
In this part of the Article, I provide some background to each of
these cases for two main reasons. First, not all readers will be familiar
with the cases prosecuted before the Court. Second, the overview shows
the small number of cases tried and the relative level of responsibility of
the accused vis-A-vis other, better known players in the conflict. It there-
fore contextualizes my later criticism regarding who was prosecuted and
who was not.
As we shall see below, the bulk of the indictments were initially is-
sued separately in March 2003 with all the remainder following in the
next few months.52 They were later joined into three main trials. Each
case included three alleged members of the RUF, AFRC, and CDF fac-
tions respectively-the main protagonists of the armed conflict.
A. The Revolutionary United Front Case
In the RUF Case, the first indictment was issued against the rebel
leader, Foday Saybana Sankoh, and a few of his top lieutenants, Sam
Bockarie, Issa Hassan Sesay, and Morris Kallon, in March 2003..
Augustine Gbao was separately indicted just over a month later. 4 In
December 2003, the Prosecutor withdrew the indictments against
Sankoh and Bockarie due to their confirmed deaths." At the
51. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment,
I 1 (Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.sc-s.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsFofanaandKondewaCDFCase/
TrialChamberJudgement/tabid/175/Default.aspx [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Fofana Trial Judg-
ment]. See also Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment
(May 28, 2008), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-9xsCblVrMIY%3d&tabid
=194 [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Fofana Appeals Judgment].
52. See PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, supra note 48, at 7
(reporting that indictments were issued for Brima, Sesay, Kallon, and Norman in March
2003); Prosecutor vs. Brima, Kamara and Kanu (AFRC Case), SPECIAL CT. FOR
SIERRA LEONE, http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ ProsecutorvsBrimaKamaraandKanuAFRC-
Case/tabid/106/Default.aspx [hereinafter AFRC Case Timeline] (reporting that Kamara was
indicted in March 2003 and Kanu in September 2003); Prosecutor vs. Fofana and Kondewa
(CDF Case), SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.sc-si.org/CASES/ Prosecutorvs-
FofanaandKondewaCDFCase/tabid/104/Default.aspx [hereinafter CDF Case Timeline]
(reporting that Fofana and Kondewa were indicted in June 2003); Prosecutor vs. Sesay,
Kallon and Gbao (RUF Case), SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.
sc-si.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsSesayKallonandGbaoRUFCase/tabid/105/Default.aspx [here-
inafter RUF Case Timeline] (reporting that Gbao was indicted in April 2003).
53. For a basic timeline describing the progression of the case, see RUF Case Timeline,
supra note 52.
54. Id.
55. The deaths of Sankoh and Bockarie led to withdrawals of their indictments. See
id.; Prosecutor v. Bockarie, Case No. SCSL-2003-04-FT, Withdrawal of Indictment (Dec. 8,
2003), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=w81c%2bZX4wAI%3d&tabid=189;
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Prosecution's request, the Trial Chamber ordered joint trials for Sesay,
Kallon, and Gbao in January 2004.
The Prosecutor obtained an amended indictment in August of 2006,
alleging eight counts of crimes against humanity, eight counts of war
crimes, and two counts of other serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law. 7 The charges included murder, rape, sexual slavery,
other inhumane acts, violence to life, terrorizing the civil population,
collective punishments, mutilation, pillage, use of child soldiers, and
attacks on U.N. peacekeeping personnel."'
The trial opened on July 5, 2004, and concluded on August 5, 2008.'9
The Trial Chamber found each of the three accused guilty of most of the
counts alleged in the indictment for crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and other serious violation of international humanitarian law.'
Many of the findings at the trial level were upheld by the Appeals
Chamber.6 ' The few instances where the defense's arguments prevailed
on appeal, or where the appeals judges reversed the findings at trial for
certain errors, resulted in the revision of the global sentences to fifty-
two, forty, and twenty-five years for Sesay, Kallon, and Gbao respec-
*62tively.
B. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Case
Alex Tamba Brima, the first accused in the AFRC trial, was first in-
dicted in March 2003 for seventeen counts of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian
law. In May 2003, the indictment was amended to include Brima Bazzy
The Prosecutor vs. Johnny Paul Koroma, SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.sc-
sl.org/CASES/JohnnyPaulKoroma/tabid/188/Default.aspx ("Koroma fled Freetown in January
2003. His fate and whereabouts are unknown, and he is considered to be at large.").
56. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Brima, Kallon, Gbao, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2003-
05-PT, Decision and Order on Prosecution Motions for Joinder (Jan. 27, 2004), http://www.
sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=yqizQjljdiU%3d&tabid=155 (ordering a separate, joint
trial of Brima, Kamara, and Kanu of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)).
57. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-PT, Corrected
Amended Consolidated Indictment (Aug. 2, 2006), http://www.se-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?
fileticket=ppr39WF8TnM%3d&tabid=155.
58. Id.
59. RUF Case Timeline, supra note 52.
60. Prosecutor v. Sesay Trial Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment,
677-87 (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=buPKlwx%2bWSo%
3d& tabid=215.
61. Prosecutor v. Sesay Appeals Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment, 477-
80 (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CGgVJRfNF7M%
3d&tabid=218.
62. Id. at 479-80.
63. For a basic timeline describing the progression of the case, see AFRC Case Time-
line, supra note 52.
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Kamara, who was originally indicted for seventeen counts." Four
months later the third accused, Santigie Borbor Kanu, was added to the
indictment.65
In January 2004, the Trial Chamber considered the Prosecution's
motions for joinder and ordered the joint trials of Brima, Kamara, and
Kanu.66 The consolidated indictment, approved by the judges in February
2005, contained fourteen counts, including the war crimes and crimes
against humanity of murder, extermination, rape, acts of terrorism, col-
lective punishments, unlawful killings, sexual violence, use of child
soldiers, enslavement, and other inhumane acts.
The trial opened on March 7, 2005, and concluded with closing ar-
guments on December 8, 2006. Each of the accused was found guilty, in
the words of the Trial Chamber, of committing "some of the most hei-
nous, brutal and atrocious crimes ever recorded in human history."6 "
Expressing outrage over the extent to which "innocent civilians were
subjected to such savage and inhumane treatment,"69 the judges sen-
tenced Brima and Kanu to fifty years each, while Kamara was given
forty-five years."o
C. The Civil Defense Forces Case
Sam Hinga Norman was the first accused in the CDF Case.7 ' He was
indicted on March 7, 2003." His indictment was amended to include
Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa on June 26, 2003." The trials of
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Brima, Kallon, Gbao, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2003-
05-PT, Decision and Order on Prosecution Motions for Joinder, 19 (Jan. 27, 2004),
http://www.sc-si.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=yqizQjljdiU%3d&tabid=155.
67. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Further
Amended Consolidated Indictment, 141-79 (Feb. 18, 2005), http://www.sc-si.org/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Of5nG3SDgf0-&tabid=106.
68. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Sentencing Judg-
ment, 134 (July 19, 2007), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=v3P% 2fxMo
Nm6U%3d&tabid=173.
69. Id. 135.
70. Id. 136.
71. For a basic timeline describing the progression of the case, see CDF Case Timeline,
supra note 52.
72. Id. See also Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-
PT, Indictment (Feb. 5, 2004), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=3DY274jtZAY=
&tabid=104.
73. See CDF Case 7imeline, supra note 52.
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these three individuals were formally joined7 4 in January of 2004, and the
final consolidated indictment was issued nearly a year later." The latter
alleged the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
other serious violations of international humanitarian law. The eight
counts included murder, acts of terrorism, collective punishments,
pillage, looting and burning, terrorizing the civilian population, and
causing physical violence and mental suffering. Charges were not in-
76
cluded for sex related crimes.
Norman died while in the custody of the SCSL, in the period be-
tween the conclusion of his case and issuance of the judgment.
Consequently, the Trial Chamber terminated the proceedings against
him, though his family opposed termination because they felt he could
be vindicated.7
The trial of Fofana and Kondewa, which began on June 3, 2004,
ended on October 18, 2006.78 The majority of the Trial Chamber found
74. Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, Decision
and Order on Prosecution Motions for Joinder (Jan. 28, 2004), http://www.sc-sI.org/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=fRXpQ3jh5WI%3d&tabid=153.
75. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR73,
Decision on Amendment of the Consolidated Indictment (May 16, 2005), http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspxfileticket-r%2fwE4THduNw%3d&tabid=193.
76. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision
on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment (May 20, 2004), http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=2HXkGY17w80%3d&tabid=153; Prosecutor v. Norman,
Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Majority Decision on the Prosecution's Appli-
cation for Leave to File an Interlocutory Appeal Against the Decision on the Prosecution's
Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment Against Samuel Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana
and Allieu Kondewa (Aug. 2, 2004), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
E%2bSYEZIEOfQ%3d&tabid=153 (rejecting the Prosecutor's application to add sex crimes
to the indictment). See also SARA KENDALL & MICHELLE STAGGS, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY
WAR CRIMES STUDIES CTR., SILENCING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
CDF CASE AT THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (2005); Michelle Staggs Kelsall &
Shanee Stepakoff, 'When We Wanted to Talk about Rape': Silencing Sexual Violence at the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, I INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 355 (2007).
77. The family effectively thought that the judgment could clear Norman's name but, as
we shall see presently, the overall outcome of the trial undermines such speculation. See Pros-
ecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on Registrar's
Submission of Evidence of Death of Accused Samuel Hinga Norman and Consequential
Issues (May 21, 2007), http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl/Public/SCSL-04-14-PT%20CDF/SCSL-04-
14-T-776.pdf; Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Norman
Defence Team Submissions on His Death, 21 (Mar. 22, 2007), http://www.sc-
sl.org/scsl/Public/SCSL-04-14-PT%20CDF/SCSL-04-14-T-774.pdf; Prosecutor v. Fofana &
Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on Norman Defence Motion for Extension of
Time to Seek Leave to Appeal Against Decision on Registrar's Submission of Evidence of the
Death of Accused Samuel Hinga Norman and Consequential Issues (July 19, 2007),
http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl/Public/SCSL-04-14-PT%20CDF/SCSL-04-14-T-782.pdf (dismissing
appeal for lack of merit).
78. CDF Case Timeline, supra note 52.
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the two men guilty. 9 The Sierra Leonean judge, Bankole Thompson, dis-
sented.m The majority, comprised of two international judges from
Cameroon and Canada respectively, convicted the defendants of various
war crimes and crimes against humanity. The convictions included mur-
der, child recruitment, collective punishments, violence to life, health,
and physical or mental wellbeing of persons (in particular murder and
cruel treatment), and pillaging."
As with the other two cases, the guilty findings reached at trial were
more or less upheld on appeal." The Trial Chamber had taken the CDF's
rationale of fighting to restore democracy as a mitigating factor in sen-
tencing. The Appeals Chamber, however, reversed that decision and
increased the sentence for Fofana from eight to fifteen years, while Kon-
dewa was awarded twenty (instead of only six) years." With their
appeals now exhausted, the eight surviving convicts from the RUF,
AFRC, and CDF trials have since been transferred to Mpanga Prison in
Rwanda to serve their long jail terms.
79. Prosecutor v. Fofana Trial Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment
(Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsFofanaandKondewaCDFCase/
TrialChamberJudgement/tabid/175/Default.aspx.
80. Id. at C-37 to -38 (Thompson, B., concurring and partially dissenting). Valerie Oos-
terveld, International Criminal Justice, Politics and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 102
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoC. 19, 21 (2008); William A. Schabas, International Criminal Tribu-
nals: A Review of 2007, 6 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 382, 388 (2008); William A. Schabas,
Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 731, 750 (2008) [hereinafter Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion]; Joseph A. K.
Sesay, Commentary, An Evaluation of the Motion for the Withdrawal of Justice Thompson,
CTR. FOR ACCOUNTABILITY & RULE OF LAW (Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.carl-sl.org/
home/index.php?option=comscontent&view=article&id=89:an-evaluation-of-the-motion-for-
the-withdrawal-of-justice-thompson&catid=10:commentaries&Itemid=21#emjt-ref_3.
81. Prosecutor v. Fofana Trial Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T.
82. Prosecutor v. Fofana Appeals Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment
(May 28, 2008), http://www.se-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-9xsCblVrMIY%3d&tabid
= 194.
83. Id. See Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment on
the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=7U8%2fVrPndPg%3d&tabid=175.
84. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone Outreach and Public Affairs Office,
Special Court Prisoners Transferred to Rwanda to Serve Their Sentences (Oct. 31, 2009),
available at http://www.sc-s.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=YiPY3dNd%2fil%3d&tabid=214.
See also Amended Agreement Between the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Rwanda on the Enforcement of Sentences of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, Special Court for Sierra Leone-Rwanda, Mar. 18, 2009, http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=WNTKRbIUNNc%3d&tabid=176.
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D. The Charles Taylor Case
Today, the trial of former Liberian President Charles G. Taylor is the
only one remaining before the SCSL." An initial eighteen-count
indictment was first issued and confirmed in March 2003." As part of a
peace deal in Liberia, Taylor relinquished power and went into exile in
Nigeria. About two years later, he was apprehended by Nigerian
authorities while allegedly fleeing the country. Taylor has since given his
version of the story and contends that authorities in Nigeria had offered
him safe passage to leave the country." Whatever the case may be,
following his arrest at the end of March 2006, he was immediately flown
to Liberia and thereafter swiftly transferred to the custody of the Court."
After Taylor's arrest, but before his trial opened, the Prosecutor
sought an amended indictment." In the further amended indictment, de-
signed apparently to address the defective pleading of the Joint Criminal
Enterprise doctrine, he was charged with eleven counts of war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law." These include: murder; acts of terrorism; the use of
85. Given that I served as court-appointed duty counsel to former President Taylor
during the opening of his trial, and my previous role as the Legal Advisor to the Defense Of-
fice in the SCSL, I have refrained from commenting on the merits of the Taylor Case for
reasons of professional ethics. While I am no longer employed by the tribunal, this is the
proper thing to do as the case is currently sub judice before the Court. Once trial judgment is
rendered, one can engage in academic analysis of the case. For the drama that unfolded in
front of world media during the opening of the trial, see Transcript of Record, Prosecutor v.
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T (June 4, 2007), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?
fileticket=PlalCui9PkU%3d&tabid=160. For commentary, see Richard J. Wilson, 'Emaciated'
Defense or a Trend to Independence and Equality of Arms in Internationalized Criminal Tri-
bunals?, 15 Hum. RTs. BRIEF 6 (2008).
86. For a basic timeline describing the progression of the case, see Prosecutor vs.
Charles Taylor, SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.sc-s.org/CASES/
ProsecutorvsCharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx [hereinafter Taylor Case 7imeline].
87. Transcript of Record at 24347-49, Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T
(July 14, 2009), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=DqhX5YnoN4%3d&tabid
=160.
88. See Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone Office of the Prosecutor, Chief
Prosecutor Announces the Arrival of Charles Taylor at the Special Court (Mar. 29, 2006),
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=hWEjA9QZgl0%3d&tabid=196.
89. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Amended Indictment (Mar. 17,
2006), http://www.se-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VIfMuLYvYs4=&tabid=159.
90. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Decision on the Prosecution Mo-
tion Requesting Leave to Amend Indictment (May 25, 2007), http://www.sc-sl.org/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=PN0wdix2ZLO-&tabid=159. For a highly critical commentary of
the Prosecution's defective pleading of joint criminal enterprise at the SCSL, including in the
Taylor Case, see Wayne Jordash & Penelope Van Tuyl, Failure to Carry the Burden of Pmof:
How Joint Criminal Enterprise Lost Its Way at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 8 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 591, 599-601 (2010). See also Jennifer Easterday, Obscuring Joint Criminal
Enterprise Liability: The Conviction of Augustine Gbao by the Special Court of Sierra Leone,
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child soldiers; pillage; violence to life, health, and physical or mental
wellbeing of persons, in particular cruel treatment, sexual slavery, and
other forms of sexual violence, rape; and outrages against personal dig-
nity.91
In a highly controversial decision, the Security Council, relying on
its Chapter VII enforcement powers, adopted Resolution 1688 on June
16, 2006, authorizing Taylor's transfer to The Hague. The President of
the SCSL thereafter issued an order giving judicial imprimatur to the
92decision. Addressing important matters with implications for the rights
of the accused-in particular the presumption of innocence-both the
resolution and the order expressed concerns about the potential instabil-
ity that would have resulted in Liberia and Sierra Leone had Taylor been
formally tried at the seat of the Court in Freetown.' Taken together,
these decisions appear to have dealt a serious blow to the legitimacy of
the SCSL among Sierra Leoneans, as many wished to have closer and
easier access to the trial.9M
3 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. PUBLICIST 36, 39-42 (2009) (discussing the defective pleading of
joint criminal enterprise liability in the SCSL case).
91. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, Amended Indictment, V 5-31
(Mar. 17, 2006), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VIfMuLYvYs4=&tabid=159
(Count 1: acts of terrorism; Count 2: murder; Count 3: violence to life, health and physical or
mental well-being of persons, in particular murder; Count 4: rape; Count 5: sexual slavery and
any other form of sexual violence; Count 6: outrages upon personal dignity; Count 7: violence
to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular cruel treatment;
Count 8: other inhumane acts; Count 9: child soldiers; Count 10: enslavement; Count 11:
pillage).
92. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Order Changing Venue of Proceed-
ings (June 19, 2006). For commentary, see generally Special Court for Sierra Leone: Issues
for Consideration Regarding the Location of the Trial of Charles Taylor, AMNESTY INT'L
USA (Apr. 5, 2006), http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGAFR510052006
&1ang=e (discussing considerations in making the decision to transfer Taylor, and the potential
consequences of doing so); Charles Jalloh, The Law and Politics of the Charles Taylor Case,
CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INT'L L. (Apr. 2006), http://www.ccil-ccdi.ca/index.php?option
=com_content&task=view&id=165&Itemid=76 (analyzing the Taylor defense's proffered
reasons for challenging a change of venue to the Hague); Charles Chernor Jalloh, Special
Court for Sierra Leone Dismisses Taylor Motion Against Change of Venue, AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L: ASIL INSIGHTS (June 15, 2006), http://www.asil.org/insights060615.cfm (discussing a
preliminary decision of the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL finding a defense motion challeng-
ing change of venue of the Taylor trial to be premature and therefore inadmissible).
93. S.C. Res. 1688, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1688 (June 16, 2006); Press Release,
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Special Court President Requests Charles Taylor be Tried in
The Hague (Mar. 30, 2006), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
gR%2bYCtzTfKg%3d&tabid=1 11.
94. See SARA KENDALL & MICHELLE STAGGS, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY WAR CRIMES
STUDIES CTR., INTERIM REPORT ON THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, 32-34 (2005);
Special Court for Sierra Leone: Issues for Consideration Regarding the Location of the Trial
of Charles Taylor, supra note 92 ("The organization believes that moving the trial would have
the negative effect of distancing the justice process from the Sierra Leonean people who have
suffered directly as a result of the crimes for which Charles Taylor is indicted."); The Trial of
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The Prosecution presented its case between June 4, 2007 and Febru-
ary 27, 2009.9' In total, it called ninety-one viva voce witnesses.9 The
Defense Case opened on July 13, 2009 and closed on November 12,
2010. Twenty-one witnesses testified for the Defense. The Prosecution
successfully applied to reopen its case to call three additional witnesses
during the defense phase of the trial.98 The trial formally closed on Feb-
ruary 11, 2011." Trial judgment will likely be rendered between mid-
2011 and mid-2012. Based on experience with the other SCSL cases, the
appeals process will probably continue for another six months thereafter.
III. SOME LIMITATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COURT
FOR SIERRA LEONE
To discern the quality of justice served at the Court, the trial
"achievements"-that is, the prosecutions and convictions discussed
above-must be considered through the lens of international standards of
justice. This part of the Article offers an analysis of the fairness of pro-
ceedings from the defense perspective. In doing so, I advance three main
criticisms.
First, I consider the issue of selective prosecutions. I focus on the
concept of greatest responsibility, which was formally introduced into
international criminal law by the Statute of the SCSL. I assess its mean-
Charles Taylor Must be Made Relevant to Sierra Leoneans and Liberians, AMNESTY INT'L
USA (June 1, 2007), http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGAFR
340052007.
95. Taylor Case Timeline, supra note 86.
96. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone Office of the Prosecutor, Testimony
for the Prosecution Concluded in Taylor Trial (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-9UCsv93B70k%3d&tabid=196.
97. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Decision on Public with Confiden-
tial Annexes A and B Prosecution Motion to Call Three Additional Witnesses (June 29, 2010),
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=+Hw4w/3wxKA=&tabid=159; Prosecutor v.
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for the Issuance of a Sub-
poena to Naomi Campbell (June 30, 2010), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?
fileticket=Fj4WYJwFP8E-&tabid=1 59.
98. See Taylor Case Timeline, supra note 86. The Prosecutor requested that the Trial
Chamber order scheduling of the remainder of the case and impose deadlines on the Defense's
presentation of its case. The judges dismissed the motion. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No.
SCSL-03-01-T, Decision on Prosecution Request for Orders in Relation to the Scheduling
of the Remainder of the Case (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.sc-s.org/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=t37QIxNUVyU=&tabid=159; Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No.
SCSL-03-01 -T, Order Setting a Date for Closure of the Defence Case and Dates for Filing of
Final Trial Briefs and the Presentation of Closing Arguments (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Fqr7UOU8DTY%3d&tabid=159.
99. Transcript of Record at 49314, Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T (Feb.
11, 2011), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=fU3SzuVteNQ%3d&tabid=160
(adjourning the trial sine die).
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ing and impact on prosecutorial policy and, ultimately, who was tried
(and convicted) and who was not. Second, I consider the manner in
which the individuals charged by the Prosecutor were tried. The fairness
of the trials is then measured against general due process standards ap-
plicable to the Court by fiat of its constitutive instruments and
international human rights law. Put simply, was justice not only done but
also seen to be done? Third, I show how the shoestring funding of the
SCSL translated into limited support for the Defense Office and resulted
in an inequality of arms between defense lawyers and prosecutors.
A. Excessively Narrow Interpretation of "Greatest Responsibility"
Article 1 of the Statute of the SCSL grants the Court personal juris-
diction to prosecute persons who bear the "greatest responsibility" for
serious violations of international humanitarian and Sierra Leonean law,
"including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threat-
ened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process in
Sierra Leone." By crafting a mandate suggesting that the SCSL would
actually prosecute all those bearing greatest responsibility, the Security
Council'm and the GoSL made a significant symbolic, legal, and political
commitment.'o'
In practice, the Prosecutor's overly narrow interpretation of that
phrase generated intense debates about its meaning and scope, both in-
side and outside the SCSL,'" beginning when suspects were first
arrested. The reason for the controversy stems from two main factors.
First, whereas other tribunals had been given jurisdiction over persons
responsible, this was the first time that the greatest responsibility stan-
dard was formally used in international criminal law. And second, the
constitutive instruments of the Court did not specify what it meant.
During the discussions regarding the SCSL's establishment, the Sec-
retary-General observed that the idea of greatest responsibility was the
Security Council's shorthand way of referring to the command authority
100. See Beth K. Dougherty, Right-Sizing International Criminal Justice: The Hybrid
Experiment at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 80 INT'L AFF. 311, 319 (2004) (describing
the political contention between the Security Council and the Secretariat over the best way for
the Statute to modify responsibility).
101. For more discussion on the decision and implications of this construction, see id. at
319-20, 326; James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tri-
bunals, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 639-44 (2005) [hereinafter Cockayne, The Fraying
Shoestring].
102. See, e.g., Dougherty, supra note 100, at 326 (describing how "the greatest responsi-
bility" in and of itself provided "an overly restrictive formulation,' and that, as interpreted by
the prosecutor, indicting only "a baker's dozen seems far too few").
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of the suspect and the gravity and scale of the crime.'o He found this too
limiting in terms of the number of persons that would be prosecuted. He
therefore urged the Security Council to adopt a slightly wider personal
jurisdiction (i.e. "persons most responsible") though that proposal was
rejected. While the Freetown trials have now concluded, given the small
number of persons that were ultimately prosecuted, the controversy
about the actual meaning and intent behind the phrase has resurfaced
within the body politic in Sierra Leone.
The jurisprudential meaning of greatest responsibility was articu-
lated by the CDF and AFRC Trial Chambers as well as the Appeals
Chamber of the SCSL.' Each of the two trial chambers, which are not
legally bound to adopt each other's interpretations, construed the concept
differently.' The CDF Trial Chamber held that greatest responsibility
was both a matter of prosecutorial discretion, and a "jurisdictional limi-
tation upon the Court."'" However, the judges ruled that the phrase is not
a material element that the Prosecution needed to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.'0 7 Rather, it is one that should be considered by the
Confirming Judge, at the pre-trial stage, to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence providing reasonable grounds to believe that a par-
ticular suspect bears the greatest responsibility. They reasoned that:
"[w]hether or not in actuality the Accused could be said to bear the
greatest responsibility can only be determined by the Chamber after con-
sidering all the evidence presented during trial."'O
On the other hand, the AFRC Trial Chamber found that the concept
of greatest responsibility does not serve as a distinct jurisdictional thre-
shold or limitation. Instead, it "solely purports to streamline the focus of
103. See UNSG Report, supra note 28, 1 29-31.
104. For commentary, see Valerie Oosterveld & Andrea Marlowe, Special Court for Sierra
Leone International Decisions, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 848, 855-56 (2007). For a focused compari-
son of the "greatest responsibility" as considered in the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) and AFRC
Trial Chamber Judgments, see Valerie Oosterveld, Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima
Bazzy Kamara & Santigie Borbor Kanu and Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana & Allieu Kondewa,
103 AM. J. INT'L L. 103 (2009) (discussing the Appeals Chamber position on the issue).
105. The Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not constrain the Trial Cham-
bers to giving one another's judgment binding authority. The only explicit type of stare decisis
observed at the Court is that the Appeals Chamber is to be "guided" by the decisions of the
Appeals Chamber of the ICTR and ICTY. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art.
20, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145.
106. Prosecutor v. Fofana Trial Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, 1 91-92
(Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsFofanaandKondewaCDFCase/
TrialChamberJudgement/tabid/175/Default.aspx.
107. Id. 192.
108. Id. (emphasis in original).
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prosecutorial strategy."'" In particular, taking into account the relevant
documentary history, this group of judges rejected the idea that the draft-
ers of the Statute of the SCSL could have intended "greatest
responsibility" to serve as a dispositive jurisdictional threshold which, if
unmet, would require them to dismiss a case."o On this view, because the
Prosecutor was envisioned as a separate organ of the Court charged with
making such assessments, the Trial Chamber could not review his deci-
sions to bring a case against a particular person as one of those bearing
greatest responsibility."'
The job of reconciling the two different interpretations fell to the
Appeals Chamber in the AFRC Case-their first judgment on the mer-
its."2 In response to Kanu's appeal against conviction, which argued that
the trial judges had misinterpreted and misapplied the applicable per-
sonal jurisdiction threshold, the appeals judges ruled that greatest
responsibility serves only as a guide to prosecutorial discretion and not a
limitation on jurisdiction. They essentially endorsed the separation of
powers argument advanced by some of their colleagues at the trial level.
As they put it:"'
It is evident that it is the Prosecutor who has the responsibility
and competence to determine who are to be prosecuted as a re-
sult of investigation undertaken by him. It is the Chambers that
have the competence to try such persons who the Prosecutor has
consequently brought before it as persons who bear the greatest
responsibility.
There are two principal issues with this interpretation. First, both the
AFRC Trial and Appeals Chamber overstate the scope of prosecutorial
discretion. Clearly, under the statute, there are jurisdictional require-
ments and standards of proof that the Prosecutor must meet in order to
bring a case against a particular suspect. These include showing that the
requisite personal, temporal, and subject matter jurisdiction as set out by
109. Prosecutor v. Brima Trial Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, 653
(June 20, 2007), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=EqikfVSpLWM=&tabid=106
("The Trial Chamber, with the greatest respect, does not agree with the finding of Trial Cham-
ber I ... that 'the issue of personal jurisdiction is a jurisdictional requirement.' ").
110. Id.
Ill. Id. 654.
112. See Prosecutor v. Brima Appeals Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Judgment,
281 (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsBrimaKamaraandKanu
AFRCCase/AppealJudgment/tabid/216/Default.aspx; Oosterveld & Marlowe, supra note
104, at 856 (arguing that the Appeals Chamber judgment would be significant for this clari-
fication but that the interpretation is nonetheless unlikely to change the outcomes of the
judgments).
113. Prosecutor v. Brima Appeals Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, 281.
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the relevant instruments is fulfilled. Considering that the trial judges al-
ready review prosecutorial decisions with regard to those requirements
through the confirmation of indictments process, it is unclear why it is
not feasible for the judges to use that process to review the threshold is-
sue of whether a particular accused appears to bear greatest
responsibility.
Admittedly, this evaluation is a difficult one and in practice may be
premature to carry out during the pre-indictment stage. Among other
things, the confirming judge would not have the same information and
body of evidence against a particular person as the Prosecutor. Under the
relevant rules, only the basic name and particulars of the suspect, a
statement of each specific offence alleged, and a brief case summary
setting out the allegations is required.' 4 The judge only has to be satis-
fied that the basic facts as alleged would, if proven, amount to a crime as
particularized in the indictment. As the standard of review is rather low
at this stage, the evaluation of whether a particular suspect bore the
greatest responsibility would be better conducted after the evidentiary
phase of the trial is completed. This offers some benefits that may oth-
erwise be unavailable.
For instance, assessment at the end of the trial gives the bench the
opportunity to evaluate the evidence presented by both the Prosecution
and the Defense, secure in the knowledge that the bulk, if not all of it,
was tested under rigorous cross-examination. They would be better
placed, based on their hearing of presumably reliable evidence, to make
the important determination that a particular accused is among those
bearing the greatest responsibility. Instead, the Appeals Chamber chose
to confer seemingly wider discretion on the Prosecutor. They failed to
consider that the exercise of discretion in law is amenable to some form
of judicial review to prevent manifestly absurd or patently unreasonable
results. In the context of the exercise of the important prosecutorial pow-
er in criminal trials, independent judicial review helps to prevent, or at
least limit, overzealous prosecutions and prosecutorial abuse of process
in relation to the rights of suspects and accused persons.
The second and more fundamental problem with the Appeals Cham-
ber's approach arises because judicial oversight of the application of the
greatest responsibility threshold is also important to ensure that the
Court fulfills its intended purpose by prosecuting only higher ranking
individuals rather than those holding a middle, or worse, lower rank. The
logical consequences of their decision is that anyone, whether bearing
114. R. P. & EVID. 47, Special Court for Sierra Leone, available at http://www.sc-
sI.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-zXPrwoukovM%3d&tabid=176.
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high levels of responsibility, or not, could be prosecutable despite the
clear language of the statute and the intent of the founders of the SCSL.
In abdicating the determination of the scope of greatest responsibility
personal jurisdiction to the Prosecutor, the appeals judges stressed that
any other interpretation that might result in the release of an accused
would, in the circumstances after such a lengthy trial, be both "unrea-
sonable and unworkable.""' This statement suggests that the judges were
ultimately more worried about the immediate implications of their find-
ings for the particular cases before them than actually delimiting the
boundaries of the Court's personal jurisdiction.
It is true that it makes little sense to require the Prosecutor to prove
that each of the accused is one of those bearing greatest responsibility or
face the alternative that the person, already factually found culpable for
the commission of specific crimes, would be released."'6 If such technical
legalistic arguments were to succeed and lead to such a result, the Court
would easily lose credibility in the eyes of the public. At the same time,
keeping in mind the overall purposes of international criminal trials and
the legislative history of the "greatest responsibility" formula chosen for
the SCSL's personal jurisdiction, it would seem that the level of respon-
sibility of an accused is ultimately a germane question to the
determination of the severity of the sentence that should be imposed."'
There is ample travaux prdparatoires to show that the phrase "greatest
responsibility" was intended to denote the political and military leader-
ship or authority position of the accused as well as a sense of the gravity,
seriousness, or massive nature of the crime."'
In other criminal tribunals, the level of responsibility of an accused
is usually evaluated based on considerations such as his level of partici-
pation in the crimes, his hierarchical rank or position, and whether he
acted in that capacity permanently or for a long period of time."9 Based
115. Prosecutor v. Brima Appeals Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, 1 281-82.
116. Id. 1282.
117. UNSG Report, supra note 28, 29-31, 36.
118. See id. See also U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Mar. 6, 2002 from the Secre-
tary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex, Report of the
Planning Mission on the Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 28, U.N. Doc.
S/2002/246 (Mar. 8, 2002); U.N. President of the Security Council, Letter dated Dec. 22, 2000
from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General, 1 1, U.N. Doe.
S/2000/1234 (Dec. 22, 2000).
119. Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment,
IN 17-25 (July 26, 2010) (addressing the accused's level of responsibility while also briefly
examining the practice of the ICTY and the International Criminal Court in this regard); Pros-
ecutor v. Luki6 & Lukid, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to
Rule llbis with Confidential Annex A and Annex B, 'f 27-28 (Int'l Crim. Trib. For the For-
mer Yugoslavia) (Apr. 5, 2007), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan lukic-sredoje_1ukic/tdec/
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on such criteria, the SCSL would have had a better and more accurate
picture of where a particular accused fell in the chain of command, in-
cluding how many subordinates and superiors he may have had. This
would be no different from the manner in which domestic criminal
courts are asked to differentiate among offenders by rendering sentences
within a specified range, depending on the gravity of the offence, the
perceived harm to the victims and, crucially, the level of legal and moral
blameworthiness of the offender.' 20
In any event, in international criminal trials, which focus on prose-
cuting the worst offenders, we often draw similar distinctions between
the "big fish," who masterminded or planned the atrocities, and the
"small fish," who merely executed them. Similarly, we intuitively attach
a different level of blameworthiness, and sentences, to those who murder
in the course of genocide as compared to those who carry out an assault
on a prisoner of war, which might constitute a war crime in the context
of an armed conflict. In sum, all these considerations speak to why the
Court should have been more deliberate in its interpretation and applica-
tion of the greatest responsibility personal jurisdiction requirement.
B. Selective Prosecutions: Commanders, but
What of the Profiteers?
It is evident that the Prosecutor of the SCSL-especially David
Crane who prepared the initial indictments-had an immensely diffi-
cult task 2 ' in determining whom to prosecute as bearing the "greatest
responsibility" for the "serious violations" 22 of international humani-
tarian law committed in Sierra Leone. The widespread nature of the
crimes, their brutality, and the large number of persons involved in
their commission might have initially appeared overwhelming. Still, he
undoubtedly had a wide margin of discretion to decide whom to indict.
This decision would have been controlled by, amongst other factors,
the quality of evidence available, the geographic spread of the crimes
throughout Sierra Leone, and his professional assessment of his of-
fice's ability to discharge the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in a given case.
en/070405.pdf; Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-20-Anx2, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58, 22 (Feb. 10, 2006), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc530350.pdf.
120. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 15 (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2002).
121. Phoebe Knowles, The Power to Prosecute: The Special Court for Sierra Leone from
a Defence Perspective, 6 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 387, 405 (2006) (noting the complexity of Arti-
cle 1 of the Statute: "What this means in theory and, crucially, in practice, remains
unresolved.").
122. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, 1 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 145.
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As noted above, in deciding who to indict, the Court's Prosecutor
essentially chose to focus on some of the political and military leaders
from each of the combating parties: the rebel RUF; the CDF militia
from the government side; and the rogue elements of the Sierra Leone
Army that constituted the AFRC. In this context, former President
Taylor is easily the highest profile and most important leader to have
been charged before the SCSL. His case is thus the jewel in the Prose-
cutor's crown. Had Taylor not been indicted, or eventually arrested
once indicted, many in Sierra Leone would have concluded that the
Court was simply a failure.123
Prosecutor Crane has explained in one interview that he felt bound
to charge those with greatest responsibility "who caused, sustained,
aided and abetted the tragedy." 24 However, many Sierra Leonean vic-
tims of the war and the international public remain largely in the dark
as to why certain individuals, within that range, were prosecuted in-
stead of others.'2 They deserve to know. Though the Prosecutor does
not have a legal obligation to explain his decision, there are significant
legitimacy gains arising from greater transparency in how he was
guided in that process-as is the practice of the Prosecutor of the In-
ternational Criminal Court. It also helps to settle outstanding questions
raised by some, such as the NGO Human Rights Watch, regarding why
information obtained during the investigations was not used to prose-
cute additional persons in Sierra Leone. 126
By its nature, the black box of prosecutorial discretion serves to
fuel speculation. For instance, it is said that in addition to the group of
eight individuals who were formally charged, and successfully prose-
cuted, many others may have also shared the greatest responsibility
burden for the atrocities committed. These omissions were exacerbated
by the fact that some known leaders never saw their days in court. 127 To
123. Crane, Terrorists, Warlords, and Thugs, supra note 48, at 514 (describing one of the
greatest challenges for the Court as "Mandate Enforcement"-essentially that the Court could
only be successful if Charles Taylor was turned over).
124. Charles Cobb Jr., West Africa: Nigeria Will Hand Over Charles Taylor Predicts War
Crimes Prosecutor, ALLAFRICA (Sept. 24, 2003) (Interview by Charles Cobb Jr. with David
Crane, Chief Prosecutor), http://allafrica.com/stories/200309250972.html.
125. For another vague statement of the Prosecutor that the formulation "greatest re-
sponsibility" narrowed the potential indictments "from 30,000 to around 20" with no further
explanation, see Crane, Terrorists, Warlords, and Thugs, supra note 48, at 511-12.
126. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH [HRW], BRINGING JUSTICE: THE SPECIAL COURT FOR
SIERRA LEONE: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, SHORTCOMINGS, AND NEEDED SUPPORT 6 (2004).
127. Alie Kabba allegedly started as Qaddafi's contact person for Sierra Leonean revolu-
tionaries, and Sankoh, amongst other activities, traveled with Kabba to Libya and met with
Charles Taylor through Kabba. LANSANA GBERIE, A DIRTY WAR IN WEST AFRICA: THE RUF
AND THE DESTRUCTION OF SIERRA LEONE 6, 49-52 (2005) (describing Sankoh as the leader
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add insult to injury, while the Prosecutor indicted alleged rebel leaders
like Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, and the AFRC's Johnny Paul Koro-
ma, they were never actually tried by the Court either because they
died or disappeared. 12 In fairness, these outcomes do not appear to be a
fault of the prosecution.
Serious criticisms can also be made about the extremely small
number of trials. President Kabbah had stated his initial expectation
that with a jurisdictional provision focused on those most responsible,
the number of persons tried could be limited to "dozens."'29 At a mini-
mum, dozens suggest twenty-four to thirty-six people and potentially
even more. Similarly, Ralph Zacklin, the legal counsel to the United
Nations who negotiated the SCSL Agreement reportedly stated in Sep-
tember 2000 that between twenty-five and thirty persons were expected
to be prosecuted before the Court.3 o The former British High Commis-
sioner in Sierra Leone, who played a pivotal role supporting the
democratically elected Kabbah government during the rebel invasion of
Freetown in January 1999, estimated between fifteen and thirty.'
Prosecutor Crane has suggested that the "greatest responsibility"
formula narrowed his list of suspects from 30,000 individuals to about
twenty.3 2 His reasoning is highly problematic. For one thing, he insinu-
ates that all combatants in the Sierra Leone war could have been
prosecuted. This is simply not the case because of the limited personal
jurisdiction captured by the greatest responsibility idea. As seen earlier,
that formulation was the result of a political compromise among the
powers that be in the international community. Still, in the end, it was
up to him to decide the specific numbers of persons to prosecute based
on his prosecutorial strategy and his understanding of the jurisdictional
parameters set out in the statute.133
The SCSL Prosecutor basically failed to meet Sierra Leonean ex-
pectations of internationally-supported justice as only thirteen
of the RUF and Kabba as one of the first inciters. It was Kabba's expulsion from school due to
his virulently pro-Qaddafi student organization that led him to initiate "something that would
have a profound and destructive result much later: the training of would-be revolutionaries in
Libya in preparation for an armed assault against the APC state"). See also Ibrahim Abdullah,
Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra
Leone, 36 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 203, 214 (1998).
128. As discussed earlier, the deaths of Sankoh and Bockarie led to the withdrawal of
their indictments.
129. Kabbah Letter to UNSC, supra note 3, Enclosure § 4.
130. HRW, supra note 126, at 20-21 n.79.
131. Peter Penfold, Will Justice Help Peace in Sierra Leone?, OBSERVER (U.K.),
Oct. 20, 2002, available at http://www.guardian.co.uklworld/2002/oct/20/sierraleone
.theworldtodayessays.
132. See Crane, Termrists, Warlords, and Thugs, supra note 48, at 508-09, 511-12.
133. See id. at 511-12.
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indictments have been formally issued in a court that operated for
about ten years. Though there could always be sealed indictments, it
seems highly unlikely that this number will change in the Court's
drawdown phase. With Norman's passing during his trial, this means
that of the thirteen people for whom the prosecution successfully
sought indictments, only nine were ultimately tried. According to one
commentator, before Taylor was arrested, if the Prosecutor was at-
tempting a top to bottom approach of determining greatest
responsibility, the number of suspects and accused missing render the
indictment list "an unusually bottom-heavy picture."'" Taylor's arrest
and trial does not appear to significantly change that critique, even if it
mitigates it somewhat. On this view of the import of greatest responsi-
bility, we are left with what appears to be one person at the apex of the
pyramid, one or two persons in the middle, and the rest at or near the
very bottom.
The formal leadership position of an individual is obviously impor-
tant. However, it is not the only indicia of bearing the greatest
responsibility. Human Rights Watch has rightly argued, for instance,
that some persons who may not have been at the top of the chain of
command, but who stood out from their colleagues because of the ex-
cessive brutality of their crimes against civilians, also deserved
prosecution.' Some activists have even gone as far as offering names
of individuals that could have been indicted. In this vein, allegedly bru-
tal regional and field commanders such as Alhaji Bayo, Bai Bureh,'16
Musa Junisa, Savage,17 and Adama "Cut Hand,"1 8 who allegedly
134. Knowles, supra note 121, at 406-07 (considering the two options of a top-down or
threshold line approach to determining those who bear the greatest responsibility).
135. HRW, supra note 126, at 19-20.
136. According to a key witness, Commander Tall Bai Bureh led the RUF attack on
Guinea. Transcript of Record, Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T, 5339-40
(Mar. 5, 2008), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspxfileticket=dqtl yErflOo=&tabid= 160.
137. Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring, supra note 101, at 643 (noting the common
critique that the net should have been cast wider to include persons such as Savage, Musa
Junisa and Alhaji Bayo).
138. HRW, supra note 126, at 20 (suggesting names of those who might have been pros-
ecuted). There are also multiple references to the brutality of Adama "Cut Hand" from
witnesses at the SCSL. Transcript of Record, Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No.
SCSL-2004-15-T, 91 (Oct. 19, 2004), http://www.sc-s.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
KIEEas6mTg8%3d&tabid=156 ("At all times when we go on operation, she goes and takes
[killings] as her hobby. [Killings not for military purposes but for] black magic and . . . the
personal enjoyment of an SLA woman named Adama Cuthand"); Transcript of Record at 99
Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-03-01-T, 38064-66 (Mar. 25, 2010),
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=jvOWeVJQTXO-&tabid=160. For a summary
of some of the testimony about Adama "Cut Hand," see KIRAN GREWEL, UNIV. OF CAL.
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initiated and specialized in civilian amputations, apparently escaped
prosecutorial attention largely because of the Prosecutor's overly narrow
interpretation of his jurisdiction, which in turn, seemed to have been dri-
ven by concerns about the limited funding available to the Court.3
There are also senior military commanders and operatives hailing
from West African countries, such as Liberia and the Gambia, who may
have also planned and carried out atrocities. At least some of them would
arguably fall within the narrow leadership-collaborator group that Presi-
dent Kabbah cited when he requested U.N. support for the creation of a
special tribunal.'" Perhaps more importantly, if we accept the Prosecu-
tor's allegations that many of the peddlers of violence "were graduates of
the terrorist training camps in Libya" working towards Libya's master
plan to create a "fiefdom" in Sierra Leone and West Africa through the
provision of training and logistics for the RUF, then perhaps President
Muammar al-Qadhafi should have also been on the docket to answer
charges. 4' By the same token, President Blaise Compaor6 of Burkina
Faso, who is said to have also provided weapons, training, and logistics
to the rebels, might have also been indicted.142 Indeed, Crane has claimed
that those leaders were unindicted co-conspirators of Taylors.
The problem with these grave public allegations by human rights
groups and former Prosecutor Crane is essentially one of proof. As a
threshold matter, though indictments were never issued, they may consti-
tute violations of the presumption of innocence. In addition, as charges
were never brought, we have no way of determining whether, for exam-
ple, there is credible evidence supporting the claim that any of these
individuals aided or abetted the commission of international crimes dur-
ing the relevant temporal jurisdiction (i.e. after November 30, 1996).
Neither can we determine whether there is sufficient evidence of the req-
BERKELEY WAR CRIMES STUDIES CTR., SPECIAL COURT MONITORING PROGRAM UPDATE #82
(2006), available at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/-warcrime/documents/Report82 001.pdf.
139. See HRW, supra note 126, at 4 ("Human Rights Watch has concerns about aspects
of the Special Court's operations that are hampering its work, many of which directly relate to
inadequate funding of the court by donors.").
140. See Kabbah Letter to UNSC, supra note 3, at 2.
141. See Crane, Terrorists, Warlords, and Thugs, supra note 48, at 506; see also Clarence
Roy-Macaulay, UN-Backed Court Alleges Liberian, Libyan Backing as First Sierra Leone
Rebels Go on Trial, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 22, 2004 (noting that Prosecutors described a
network of foreign support for the rebels, including the training and forces from Muammar el-
Qaddafi, who was mentioned in the Court's indictments).
142. See Cobb, supra note 124, at 4 (citing Prosecutor Crane as having referred to the
"worldwide criminal investigation" of the SCSL, explained that the conflict was regional and
international, and noted his international mandate expands throughout West Africa. Cobb
followed by asking: "How nervous should I be if I am, say, the president of Burkina Faso?"
The Prosecutor evaded the question: "We're looking at everyone neutrally and fairly and
again, following the evidence wherever it may lead.").
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uisite criminal intent and knowing participation of any of these individu-
als in the perpetration of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or other
serious violations of international humanitarian law in Sierra Leone.
To be fair to the Prosecutor, of course, having evidence is one thing,
but deciding to seek an indictment based on that evidence is another.
Perhaps he had information against certain personalities that could sup-
port a prima facie case for the issuance of an arrest warrant. But he could
still choose not to proceed for other reasons. For instance, in a sover-
eignty conscious world, it is hard for any international prosecutor to
indict three sitting heads of state (Qadhafi and Compaor6, in addition to
Taylor), even putting aside potential difficulties with head of state im-
munity. While we could speculate that he could have had a strong legal
case, the political fallout from such actions might, in his judgment, have
been too big a burden for the fledgling Sierra Leone tribunal to handle.143
Indeed, Crane has noted the tendency of international politics to "blow
back" and obstruct international justice when attempts are made to pros-
ecute heads of government.'" It is therefore not far-fetched to speculate
that this could have been a factor in his assessment of whom he could
prosecute.
Other important factors would also be relevant in decisions on
whether or not to proceed. For instance, pragmatic questions of state co-
operation could arise regarding the likelihood that a particular state
would be pressured by the Security Council and the international com-
munity to hand over its leader to the Court for prosecution. This is not
trivial considering the stormy state-centric seas that all international
criminal tribunals must navigate to achieve even the most basic things
that mature municipal criminal justice systems can take for granted; for
example, the issuance and enforcement of an arrest warrant. Viewed in
this light, to the extent that there is a reasoned legal basis for his deci-
sion, rather than other improper motives, it would be hard to blame the
Prosecutor as reasonable minds could differ on such strategic assess-
ments.
143. While restraining himself from issuing indictments, the Prosecutor has in some
ways indulged by creating a political stage of the courtroom. Scholars critique the Prosecutor
as having "strongly over-stated the connections" (i.e., between combatants and Libya and al
Qaeda) and for giving the impression that the Office of the Prosecutor is a "staging-base" for
U.S. foreign affairs and intelligence. Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring, supra note 101, at
656.
144. David M. Crane, Dancing with the Devil: Prosecuting West Africa's Warlords:
Building Initial Prosecutorial Strategy for an International Tribunal After Third World Armed
Conflicts, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (2005) [hereinafter Crane, Dancing with the Devil]
(noting that this "can lead to odd and frustrating results").
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Besides military commanders and heads of state, also clearly miss-
ing from the above list were the Belgian, Dutch, Italian, Israeli,
Lebanese, and other foreign businessmen and profiteers who allegedly
played an equally critical role by financing the war from a distance and
amassing the loot.'45 These are, in many ways, the real financial benefici-
aries of the war. Indeed, the role of diamonds in fuelling the death and
destruction that took place in Sierra Leone appears to be well docu-
mented.'" Thus, many informed Sierra Leoneans would question
whether there is true justice where the foreign individuals and the pri-
marily Western corporations that apparently benefited the most from
their country's ruin, such as the diamond oligopoly DeBeers, remained
untouched.147 Although the SCSL only has jurisdiction to prosecute natu-
ral but not legal or corporate persons, it is evident that there is nothing in
the Statute of the Court that would have prevented bringing charges
against foreign corporate executives deemed to bear the greatest respon-
sibility for their aiding and abetting as well as complicity in war crimes
and crimes against humanity.141
Ironically, in an effort to be fair in issuing indictments, the Prosecu-
tor went too far the other way. Whereas he was under-inclusive in whom
he decided to prosecute, he was over-inclusive in respect of those that he
chose to prosecute. He indicted people that, in the context of Sierra
Leone, seemed difficult for the population to accept.149 In fact, according
145. In many public speeches, David Crane has alleged that the following foreign busi-
nessmen and individuals belonged to what he alleges is a "West African Joint Criminal
Enterprise," all of whom he claims were associated with Taylor: Sammy Osally; Ibrahim Bah;
Victor Bout; Vladimir Menin; Aziz Nasur; and Gus Kouwenhoven. See, e.g., David M. Crane,
Professor, Syracuse Univ. College of Law, The Triumph of Good Over Evil ... The Investiga-
tion, Indictment, and Arrest of Charles Taylor: A Regional Approach to Justice, Speech at
Buffalo Law School (Feb. 17, 2010) (on file with author). One of those cited by Crane, Gus
Kouwenhoven, was recently prosecuted in the Netherlands but was acquitted. For an excellent
comment on the proceedings before the Dutch courts, see Larissa van den Herik, The Difficul-
ties of Exercising Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: The Acquittal of a Dutch
Businessman for Crimes Committed in Liberia, 9 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 211 (2009). Though
vacating the post a few years ago, he appears to have continued in the role as a shadow SCSL
prosecutor.
146. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 11-12.
148. The International Commission of Jurists recently released a formidable study dis-
cussing corporations and the accountability question. See I INT'L COMM'N JURISTS,
CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COM-
MISSION OF JURISTs EXPERT LEGAL PANEL ON CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES: FACING THE FACTS AND CHARTING A LEGAL PATH, available at http://
icj.org/IMGIVolume_1.pdf.
149. E.g. INT'L CRISIS GRP., THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: PROMISES AND
PITFALLS OF A "NEW MODEL" 5-6 (2003) [hereinafter ICG, PROMISES AND PITFALLS] ("Many
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to some scholars, in their "sincere attempt at balanced prosecution,"'
the Prosecution might have been too daring for the delicate political bal-
ance necessary in the post-conflict society.15 '
To be clear, I do not question the legality of the warrants, especially
given the Appeals Chamber position that decisions regarding whom to
prosecute must more or less be made by the Prosecutor. Rather, I merely
challenge the propriety of issuing certain warrants, such as those against
leaders of the CDF, like Norman,5 the Deputy Defense Minister to Pres-
ident Kabbah. Many Sierra Leoneans are resentful that their "hero" was
prosecuted.' The man who sacrificed so much to stop rebel atrocities
was perceived by many as a national hero deserving of a medal of honor.
Not only was he denied such recognition; he was rewarded with prosecu-
tion for international crimes for the excesses of the militia that he
oversaw.'5 The ultimate irony being that Norman was jailed with his
former enemies in the same detention facility.
Others are angered that his boss, the President, who gave him orders
and who doubled as Defense Minister, was spared while he took the fall.
The doctrine of command responsibility enshrined in the Statute of the
SCSL suggests that to the extent that liability would have been found on
the part of Norman for the activities of the CDF militia, Kabbah, his
boss, would also share at least a measure of that responsibility.'5 Sierra
Sierra Leoneans were shocked by the arrest of Sam Hinga Norman ... who fought for the
government against the RUF and AFRC junta.").
150. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 80, at 750 ("Perhaps the most sincere
attempt at balanced prosecution came from the Prosecutor of the SCSL. He issued three clus-
ters of indictments, each directed at a different group in the conflict, including the
government-supported Civil Defence Forces.").
151. See Elizabeth M. Evenson, Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone: Coordination Be-
tween Commission and Court, 104 CoLUM. L. REv. 730, 742-43 (2004) (discussing Norman's
indictment as illustrating "the complexity of conflict . . . and the difficulty of constructing new
governments unburdened by past crimes and old allegiances," as the CDF were initially de-
fenders of the people against the rebels).
152. Id. at 742 (referring to this as "the most daring indictment").
153. See William A. Schabas, A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in TRUTH COMMISSIONS
AND COURTS: THE TENSION BETWEEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 43
(William A. Schabas & Shane Darcy eds., 2004)[hereinafter Schabas, A Synergistic Relation-
ship] ("Norman's arrest stunned many Sierra Leoneans who see him as a hero for his role in
the war against the Revolutionary United Front."). In addition to my own personal interviews,
there are documented interviews conducted by other organizations, such as the International
Crisis Group, revealing similar sentiments. ICG, PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra note 149, at 6
n.36 ("All individuals interviewed stated that they 'felt bad' about their leader being indicted
as they consider him a national hero who stood up first against all armed groups attacking
defenseless civilians. However, they consistently said that the CDF were not made 'to fight for
Norman, but to fight for the country', and they did not view the Special Court as a threat to
government or nation.").
154. Schabas, A Synergistic Relationship, supra note 153, at 43.
155. In the SCSL, like other international criminal tribunals, the fact that crimes were
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Leoneans seem to appreciate the intuitive elements of that legal concept.
The issue of command responsibility was further complicated by low
politics and the political ambitions and rivalries of the personalities in-
volved. Norman was from the majority Mende ethnic group and had
long held the desire to run for political office to replace President Kab-
bah as leader of the then governing Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP).
On the other hand, Kabbah had a different idea of who should re-
place him as party leader: Solomon Berewa."' Berewa, who was
Minister of Justice when the SCSL was established and thus played an
important role in its creation, later became vice president. Kabbah nomi-
nated Vice President Berewa, also from the Mende ethnic group, to
succeed him."' Largely because of popular disquiet about Norman's ar-
rest, and a split Mende vote in the south of Sierra Leone (where the
ethnic group constitutes the majority), the incumbent SLPP candidate
lost the election."' Taken together, these factors explain why Norman's
arrest and prosecution was perceived as a deeply political act among
Sierra Leoneans. The anger over the way he was treated was almost pal-
pable in most parts of the country.
At the same time, some war victims groups would probably have
celebrated the decision to move against the CDF leader. In a country
where justice is largely discredited because of a long history of judicial
corruption, patronage, and executive interference, for the first time in
their lives, they would have seen a rare sight suggesting truth to the
adage that justice is blind. They also would have seen that no one, no
matter how powerful or popular, is above the law in Sierra Leone. Such
views would have found support in the findings of the truth commission
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal respon-
sibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to
commit such acts or had done so and the superior had failed to take the necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 6, 3, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145. For
an excellent work on this doctrine, see GUiNAEL METrRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RE-
SPONSIBILITY (2009).
156. Lans Gberie, A Chat With Former President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, THE PATRIOTIC
VANGUARD (May 28, 2009), http://www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/article.php3?idarticle=
4196&cid-0&ei=Llg7StrRK4mQ9QSXnPGfCA [hereinafter Gberie, A Chat With Former
President Kabbah] (reporting Kabbah's statement that he nominated his successor).
157. Id.
158. See Editorial, Tejan Kabbah's Hand-Picked Successor Losing: Any Lessons From
Presidential Race in Sierra Leone?, STATESMAN (Ghana), Sept. 4, 2007, http://www.
thestatesmanonline.com/pages/news-detail.php?newsid=4636&section=1; Gberie, A Chat
With Former President Kabbah, supra note 156. For an academic analysis of the outcome of
the Sierra Leonean general elections, in which power was peacefufly transferred to the opposi-
tion, see Christopher Wyrod, Sierra Leone: A Vote for Better Governance, 19 J. DEMOCRACY
1, 70 (2008).
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which did not exonerate the same militia, especially the kamajors that
Norman headed, from responsibility for heinous wartime atrocities. It
would also of course find support in the catalog of unspeakable horrors
described in the Court's CDF judgment. Morality and politics aside,
there is no question that some in the militia committed international
crimes. From a positivist lawyer perspective, the decision to indict CDF
leaders could probably withstand the tough scrutiny it has received.
Whatever the case, of the rebels who were ultimately indicted and
tried, some had come to play a critical role as ambassadors of peace to-
ward the end of the war. There is therefore a measure of popular
discomfort with their prosecutions among certain sectors of the popula-
tion in Sierra Leone. For instance, many Sierra Leoneans credit Issa
Sesay, the first accused in the RUF Trial, with singlehandedly helping
end the hostilities.' Sesay's renown came when the elusive and unreli-
able Sankoh was arrested for undermining the peace process. Sesay, who
proved to be more trustworthy and predictable, was asked to replace him
as interim RUF leader.'" The new leader's efforts to help the government
demobilize and disarm the rebel combatants, at great personal risk,
earned him the moniker "liberator who brought peace to the country."16 1
Despite the depravations visited upon the civilian population by the
RUF during a decade of hostilities, and despite his indictment by the
SCSL, Sesay's support persisted, according to the International Crisis
Group. Many youth apparently indicated that they would have wished to
demonstrate peacefully in support of him.16 2 The way he was treated be-
came more disturbing to some given the evidence of prosecutorial abuse
of process that surfaced during his trial.163
Ironically, Sesay, who helped to usher peace, was prosecuted while
other senior RUF commanders who ardently fought but failed to succeed
in scuttling the peace process were spared. In a cruel stroke of fate, some
of these commanders became known Prosecution witnesses against Se-
say. They thereby benefited from the financial largesse of the Court
through the witness support section. The decision not to prosecute some
159. Sierra Leone President Lauds Rebel Leader's Contribution to Peace: UN Mission,
UN News CTR., Sept. 4, 2001, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/
printnewsAr.asp?nid=1456 (noting the President's "special mention of General Sesay's contri-
bution to the peace process"). See also ICG, PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra note 149, at 5.
160. ICG, PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra note 149, at 5.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 5 n.31 (reporting that they did not protest for fear of being stopped by the
authorities).
163. PENELOPE VAN ThYL, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY WAR CRIMEs STUDIES CTR., EF-
FECTIVE, EFFICIENT, AND FAIR? AN INQUIRY INTO THE INVESTIGATIVE PRACTICES OF THE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR AT THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 45 (2009).
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of these known perpetrators arguably contravened the explicit mandate
in Article 1(1) of the Statute to prosecute "those leaders . . . who [had]
threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process
in Sierra Leone."
Some commentators have suggested that prosecuting the different
factions equally, with an apparent lack of bias between the groups,
helped to divert some of the real culpability from the international com-
munity. They argue that the attempt at a well-rounded prosecution
effectively enabled "the international community to simply cast all of the
combatants as criminal, and thus avoid difficult questions about the in-
ternational community's own failure to defend democracy and intervene
in the region."'6 The point is that the Prosecutor's strategy could be criti-
cized from a range of perspectives. NevertheleSs, whether it was
intended to provide a cover for presumed Western guilt for the failure to
intervene in Sierra Leone is a harder argument to substantiate.
C. Shoestring Justice: Trials and Tribulations
As the SCSL trials progressed, serious critiques emerged regarding
the lack of funding hampering the Court's work in various ways. It defi-
nitely impacted the number of people that the Prosecutor felt capable of
indicting for what happened in Sierra Leone.' Thus, in some respects, it
is unfair to blame the Prosecution instead of the GoSL and the Security
Council for overly limiting the number of cases that can be tried by,
firstly, devising such narrow personal jurisdiction, and secondly, starving
the SCSL of the funds required by opting for a volatile and uncertain
funding structure for its operations. The lack of funds led to many other
issues, some of which affected the legitimacy of the Court. For example,
outreach work, which was important for communicating the trial proc-
esses to the local population, was initially frustrated by a lack of
money.'" This created a distance between the tribunal and the local pop-
ulation.
Similarly, the funding mechanism became the subject of a prelimi-
nary jurisdictional challenge as some of the defendants filed petitions
claiming that the donations-based system effectively compromised the
independence of the judges and therefore the SCSL as a whole. The
164. Knowles, supra note 121, at 408.
165. See HRW, supra note 126, at 4-6.
166. Amnesty Int'l, Statement to the National Victims Commemoration Conference:
Freetown, I and 2 March 2005, at 2 (Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.amnesty.org/
en/library/info/AFR51/002/2005/en.
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judges rejected that claim with reasoning that, at best, leaves some seri-
ous room for debate. 6 7
But, as will be discussed in the next subsection of this Article, there
is no other area where the shoestring budget of the Court hampered op-
erations more than the meager resources allocated to the defense of the
accused.1' Before turning to that argument, I will first consider the effec-
tiveness of justice on a shoestring budget and the available alternatives in
light of the early expectation that the Court's model would be more effi-
cient as compared to the Chapter VII tribunals.'g
Dissatisfaction with the ICTY and ICTR's inefficiency 7 0 largely
spawned the SCSL's unique mode of funding as well as its timeline.
Against the Secretary-General's suggestions,"' the Security Council in-
sisted on establishing a tribunal based on voluntary contributions by
167. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary
Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Judicial Independence) (Mar. 13, 2004), http://
www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=R/quLHDjKIA=&tabid=193 (rejecting the challenge
that judicial independence was conflicted by the operations of the Management Committee,
which comprises representatives of donor states, and might use their economic power to inter-
fere with the justice delivered); John R.W.D. Jones et al., The Special Court for Sierra Leone:
A Defence Perspective, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 211, 223 (2004) ("There is thus a clear avenue
for outside forces to influence adjudication by means of economic manipulation."). The Ap-
peals Chamber reasoned that the precarious funding structure of the SCSL cannot reasonably
be seen to result in any real likelihood of bias in relation to the trials before the judges. The
judicial remuneration, which was fixed for three-years, was not tied to the SCSL's funding by
donor states; nor can it be subject to some form of manipulation to secure a particular result.
The problem is that the Court did not only operate for three years. Further, in practice, the
Court, especially the President (an Appeals Chamber judge) and the Prosecutor, had to con-
stantly be on the road to fundraise. The funding drive emphasized progress of the various trials
to justify further donations to the tribunal. The fact that judicial remuneration was part of the
Court's budget could raise apprehension by a reasonable observer about potential links be-
tween the funding and outcomes of the trials. In the final analysis, the matter is not as clear cut
as the Appeals Chamber decision indicated.
168. See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Price of International Justice, 4 L. & PRAC. INT'L
CTs. & TRIBUNALS 281, 304-05 (2005) (describing that generally in criminal law, budget
squeezes pressure prosecutors to taper down indictments, leading to delays in trial and arrests
as well as other interruptions. "[W]hen the budget gets tight the first to pay the price are usu-
ally those who cannot complain: defendants and victims").
169. See Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring, supra note 101, at 624; Dougherty, supra
note 100, at 311 (noting the Security Council's determination to find a new model, and how
the SCSL represents the "attempt to right-size" international criminal law).
170. See Helena Cobban, International Courts, FoREIGN POL'Y, Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 22,
23 (noting the Chapter VII Tribunals' "ballooning" timelines and costs); Ralph Zacklin, The
Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 541, 542-43, 545 (2004)
(stating that it is "generally recognized" that the Tribunals "are unwieldy instruments, with a
cumbersome bureaucratic structure" and that they "have been too costly, too inefficient and
too ineffective") (emphasis in original).
171. UNSG Report, supra note 28, 171 ("In my view, the only realistic solution is fi-
nancing through assessed contributions. This would produce a viable and sustainable financial
mechanism affording secure and continuous funding.").
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third party states with operational oversight through a Management
Committee.7 2 In practice, this meant the success of the Court depended
upon the level of funding that it could generate from U.N. members.
Likewise, at the time of its creation, the SCSL was expected to operate
for three years.' 3 Thus, the consequence of the transfer of financial re-
sponsibility for the Court to third party countries was a gap between the
SCSL and those most invested in its mandate and success (i.e., its foun-
ders: the United Nations and the GoSL).
Let us now compare the cost of the SCSL against that of the Chap-
ter VII tribunals, focusing on the ICTR. As of December 2009, the
ICTR had spent about $1.4 billionl7 4 and the ICTY, $1.79 billion.'7 For
that money, the ICTR completed trials 6 for fifty-two accused (ten still
172. U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 30, art. 6-7.
173. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from the Secretary-General to
the President of the Security Council, 12, U.N. Doc. S/2001/40 (Jan. 12, 2001).
174. Calculated based on the expenditure of the ICTR as provided in the financial report
and audited financial statements for the biennium and reports of the Board of Auditors data
covering 1996-2007. Note that this figure only covers the costs from 1996, rather than 1994.
ICTR Financial Report and Audited Financial Statements for the Biennium Ended 31 Decem-
ber 2009, U.N. Doc. A/65/5/Add. 11; GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. No. 5K (July 16, 2010); ICTR
Financial Report and Audited Financial Statements for the Biennium Ended 31 December
2007, U.N. Doc. A/63/5/Add.11; GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 5K (2008); ICTR Financial
Report and Audited Financial Statements for the Biennium Ended 31 December 2005, U.N.
Doc. A/61/5/Add.11; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 5K (July 28, 2006); ICTR Financial Re-
port and Audited Financial Statements for the Biennium Ended 31 December 2003, U.N. Doc.
A/59/5/Add. 11; GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 5K (July 3, 2002); ICTR Financial Report and
Audited Financial Statements for the Biennium Ended 31 December 1999, U.N. Doc.
A/55/5/Add. 11; GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 5K (July 11, 2000) (providing financial reports
and audited financial statements for the bienniums of 1996-97 and 1998-99).
175. Calculated based on the expenditure of the ICTY as provided on the ICTY website
covering 1993-95 added with the financial report and audited financial statements for the
biennium and reports of the Board of Auditors data covering 1996-2009. ICTY Financial
Report and Audited Financial Statements for the Biennium Ended 31 December 2009, 26,
U.N. Doc. A/65/5/Add.12; GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. No. 5L (June 25, 2010); ICTY Financial
Report and Audited Financial Statements for the Biennium Ended 31 December 2007, 19,
U.N. Doc. A/63/5/Add.12; GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 5L (Aug. 13, 2008); ICTY Financial
Report and Audited Financial Statements for the Biennium Ended 31 December 2005, 16,
U.N. Doc. A/61/5/Add.12; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 5L (Sept. 27, 2006); ICTY Financial
Report and Audited Financial Statements for the Biennium Ended 31 December 2003, 20,
U.N. Doc. A/59/5/Add.12; GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 5L (Aug. 10, 2004); ICTY Financial
Report and Audited Financial Statements for the Biennium Ended 31 December 2001, 26,
U.N. Doc. A/57/5/Add.12; GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 5L (July 5, 2002); ICTY Financial
Report and Audited Financial Statements for the Biennium Ended 31 December 1999, 17,
U.N. Doc. A/55/5/Add.12; GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 5L (July 11, 2000) (reporting data
for the biennium of 1996-97 as well as 1998-99); The Cost of Justice, U.N. ICTY,
http://www.icty.org/sid/325.
176. These figures do not include trials in which the accused died prior to the completion
of proceedings, trials transferred according to Rule 1 Ibis procedures, or trials that never began
because of indictments being withdrawn.
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on appeal) with trials for another twenty-two in progress.'7 The ICTY,
which was established a year earlier, achieved a considerably better re-
cord: it completed trials for 125 accused, with trials for another thirty-six
in progress. 78 For only completed cases, we are left with a significant
price tag: about $26 million per accused in the ICTR, and around $19
million per accused in the ICTY.'
Not surprisingly, the Rwandan government, a key beneficiary of the
ICTR's work, has been very critical of its high expenditures. As the total
budget soared near the 1 billion dollar mark, Kigali criticized the tribu-
nal's paltry twenty-seven judgments.so Rwandan President Paul Kagame
and other senior officials disparaged the tribunal for having "disposed"
of over $1.5 billion with less than forty verdicts in eleven years.' In a
letter to the Security Council, Rwanda noted its serious "misgivings"
about the ICTR. 2 To them, the ICTR had proven to be an "enormous
and expensive undertaking" and the pace of its trials was "totally unac-
ceptable, given the financial and human resources at its disposal.""
Ultimately, in Kigali's view, the extremely slow pace of its proceedings
had "adversely affected" the perception of the justice that it rendered
both within and outside Rwanda.'
It appears that part of the criticism of the ICTR's expenditures likely
comes from frustration over Rwandan government hopes to "regain full
national ownership of the process of administration of justice for crimes
committed during the genocide.""' However, it is not just ICTR expenses
177. War Crimes Research Office at Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. Of Law, Status of
Cases, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/Cases/
StatusofCases/tabid/204/Default.aspx.
178. Key Figures of ICTY Cases, U.N. ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/
KeyFigures.
179. These numbers provide very loose estimates. In 2008, Rupert Skilbeck estimated
that the ICTR and ICTY cost $10-15 million per accused. Rupert Skilbeck, Funding Justice:
The Price of War Crimes Trials, 15 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 6, 6 (2008). If my calculations included
all accused, including those who died before completion of trial, those for whom indictments
were withdrawn, those accused whose proceedings were transferred, and those still in trial, the
ICTR cost per person would be about $17 million and the ICTY, about $11 million.
180. Cost of the ICTR to Reach One Billion USD By the End of 2007, HIRONDELLE
NEws AGENCY (Tanz.), May 12, 2006, http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/3716/26.
181. Id.
182. Letter dated July 26, 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 6, U.N. Doc. S/2002/842
(July 26, 2002).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 7 ("The speed at which the ICTR operates is totally unacceptable, given the
financial and human resources at its disposal.").
185. Stephanie Nieuwoudt, Rwandan Tribunal Under Pressure to Wind Up, THE NEW
TIMEs (Rwanda) (Jan. 24, 2007), http://iwpr.net/report-news/rwandan-tribunal-under-pressure-
wind (quoting Rwandan U.N. representative Joseph Nsengimana in a speech to the Security
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or the views of the Kagame Government that have made such large bud-
getary expenditures questionable. Some have even condemned
international criminal court processes more generally by arguing in favor
of seemingly better and cheaper alternatives to trials such as truth com-
missions.
Other relevant comparisons between the Court and internationalized,
or hybrid, criminal trials can and have been be made. According to one
commentator, in 2008, the Cambodia Tribunal had a budget of about $36
million per accused,' well above the costs of any of the other interna-
tional trials. At the other extreme, the mixed court for Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH) was running at $709,000 per trial, an amount pro-
jected to decline in the near future.'
Based on numbers alone, as compared to the Chapter VII tribunals,
the Security Council's expectation of a cheaper court have, in many
ways, been met by the SCSL. Besides shifting the burden of its cost to
interested U.N. member states instead of using the resources of the or-
ganization as a whole, the Court, with a total budget amounting so far to
only about $208.7 million,' has clearly been a significantly less expen-
sive endeavor than the ICTR and the ICTY.
The next logical question is: what did the Court achieve with its
shoestring budget? In practical terms, the SCSL has completed trials for
only eight individuals and still has one (Taylor) in progress.' Thus, as
the remaining trial effectively concluded in February 2011, as noted ear-
lier, the SCSL still costs about $23 million per trial for each accused. It
thus costs slightly lower than the total ICTR price per trial and slightly
higher than that of the ICTY.'" Overall, even though its total budget is
much lower, given the relatively low number of persons it ultimately
prosecuted over the course of nine years, the Court turns out to not be
significantly more cost efficient than the other Chapter VII courts.
One might then ask a different question: would it not have been bet-
ter to hold domestic trials in the national courts of Sierra Leone?
Probably. Could those have been more cost efficient? Yes, they likely
would have been. Still, the unique mandates of the ad hoc tribunals and
the involvement of the international community rightly generate the
Council). See also Letter dated July 26, 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, supra note 182, at 12
(describing the ICTR crossroads, and how it necessitates the transfer of cases to Rwanda, or at
the very least, the ICTR holding some trials inside Rwanda).
186. Skilbeck, supra note 179, at 6.
187. Id.
188. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
189. See supra Part II.
190. If my calculations included those accused that died before completion of trial
(Norman and Sankoh), the SCSL cost per person would be slightly lower.
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expectation that tribunals like the SCSL will provide a certain type of
justice that might not have been possible in national trials in a post-
conflict context. Fair trials in international criminal tribunals have
proven to be slow to achieve vis-i-vis domestic prosecutions for many
reasons. These include the unique nature and large scale crimes prose-
cuted at the international level. There is, of course, obviously room for
serious improvements in the efficiency of international prosecutions.
However, it may be that the need for fairer trials is not necessarily
compatible with the concept of speed as a determinant of greater cost
efficiency.
Consider for instance the ICTY's struggle to deal with a sudden rush
of defendants in custody. The tribunal resorted to plea-bargaining, ap-
parently to meet the demands of the time limits imposed by the Security
Council completion strategy.'9 ' Although early U.S. proposals anticipated
such a mechanism would be available to the tribunal because they were
seen as tools for securing more efficient prosecutions and ultimately
convictions, they were initially rejected as "incompatible with the unique
purpose" of such internationally supported courts.192 However, by the
time Judge Antonio Cassese was replaced by United States Judge
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, the new ICTY President faced many more
in-custody defendants than had her predecessor.'93
The colloquial "bang for the buck" as measured by cost per convic-
tion is improved exponentially by plea bargains. Nevertheless, these
mechanisms may not be aligned with the idea that international trials
should help to create a historical record. Neither does it sit well with the
ambitious goal of international criminal law to dispense credible justice
on behalf of the primary victims of mass atrocity crimes.194 Conse-
quently, pressures that a certain quantity of justice be served by a certain
deadline-in the case of the SCSL, three years-prove to be at grave
odds with victims' expectations as well as those of the courts set up to
dispense justice in their name.
Whether or not domestic trials were or are a more viable option-as
the government of Rwanda ardently argues in the ICTR situation and the
BiH evidence supports in Bosnia' 95-depends largely on the strength of
191. Michael P. Scharf, Trading Justice for Efficiency: Plea-Bargaining and Interna-
tional Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1070, 1074 (2004).
192. Id. at 1073.
193. Id. at 1074.
194. Id. at 1071.
195. For instance, the hybrid court in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is partially funded
by the Ministry of Justice and partially by voluntary contributions. According to Skilbeck, the
difference explaining the budgetary efficiency between the BiH and the other international
criminal courts is that the BiH has eight courtrooms and fifty-three judges, and thus, is able to
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the comparator national justice system. In Sierra Leone, the Ministry of
Justice is accorded only a very small fraction of an otherwise modest
national government budget. For instance, the budget for courts and jus-
tice-related expenditures for 2010 (based on rough estimates) is about
$959,800, about one twentieth of that of the SCSL when it was going
full-steam.'" In that tight national fiscal climate, the common adage that
"you get what you pay for" would suggest that the trials in the domestic
courts of Sierra Leone would have been substantially different both in
terms of the quantity and quality of justice served. 97 The quantity or
number of prosecutions carried out would have been higher, meaning
that the cost per individual prosecution would have been much lower.
Undoubtedly, on the other hand, the quality of justice rendered would
have also suffered. Considering the poor state of the national legal sys-
tem, except if special improvements were made, a domestic process
would have almost certainly failed to adhere to the higher international
fair trial standards we rightly demand from the internationally-supported
Court.
The challenges faced by national justice systems in prosecuting mass
atrocities are not unique to Sierra Leone or Africa. For instance, after
studying the Cambodian legal system, a U.N. expert report concluded
that "domestic trials organized under Cambodian law are not feasible
and should not be supported financially by the United Nations." In an
international environment with widely varying legal systems, it is per-
haps futile to compare the costs of international trials against those in
process many more cases much more quickly. Skilbeck, supra note 179, at 8 (noting that the
"BiH is able to process several hundred cases per year" in 2006, with pre-trial costs of only
$708,000 each, and anticipating a decrease to $236,000 per case by 2010).
196. According to the 2010 budget, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and High
Court have a combined budget of 1420.3 million Leones ($361,200 USD). Even when adding
the other relevant budgeted amounts for justice related entities: 1,241.8 Le'm budget of the
Law Officers' Department; 149.2 Le'm of the Justice and Legal Service Commission; 962.8
Le'm of the National Commission for Human Rights (subtotal 2353.8 Le'm), the total budget
for law enforcement is 3,774.1 Le'm (about $959,800 USD). Gov'T OF SIERRA LEONE,
BUDGET PROFILE, FISCAL YEAR 2008-2010, available at http://www.mofed.gov.sl/
index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=13&Itemid=28.
197. Consider, for instance, the fact that the Government of Sierra Leone is just now
launching a national legal aid scheme to provide representation for indigent defendants. On
the other hand, it is feasible that international funding to develop a special crimes section
within the Sierra Leonean justice system would have provided funding and support for a legal
aid system and other key aspects of fair trials. See The Government of Sierra Leone and JSDP
Launch Pilot National Legal Aid for Sierra Leone, VIsITSIERRALEONE.ORG, http://
www.visitsierraleone.org/Sierra-Leone-News/Dailyffhe-Govemment-of-Sierra-Leone-and-
JSDP-Launch-Pilot-National-Legal-Aid-For-Sierra-Leone.html.
198. U.N. Group of Experts for Cambodia, Rep., transmitted by letter dated Mar. 15,
1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the
President of the Security Council, 132, U.N. Docs. A/53/850, S/1999/231 (Mar. 16, 1999).
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domestic systems.'" For one thing, though a few states have prosecuted
international crimes in their national courts since the end of World War
II, the challenge for international justice is immense and unprecedented
given the "legal and factual complexities" and the international and nov-
el justice startup contexts in which such trials have been generally
held.2 %" At this much broader level, if we take arguments comparing the
relative value of international courts and national justice systems to their
logical conclusion, it would be hard to justify any kind of expenditures
for projects like the SCSL. Put differently, there would be no justifica-
tion for a secondary system of individual accountability for serious
crimes at the international level. The culture of impunity for atrocity
crimes during the last half-century indicates that conclusion too would
be untenable for humanity's fragile conscience.
Despite the various efforts to distance the SCSL-type model from
the budgetary and efficiency problems of Chapter VII courts, the Court
faced numerous challenges arising from the mandate it was given and
the circumstances surrounding its creation. First, imposing a three year
time limitation on the initial mandate created high and unrealistic expec-
tations as to what it could accomplish in the time it had.20' As some have
argued, the only way to limit budgets is to limit the number of cases, a
sort of disgruntled response of practitioners constantly badgered for the
inefficiency of their cases.202 Even so, this remains as one of the only vi-
able routes to keep costs down. Thus, faced with limited funding,
prosecutors make decisions like they did at the Court, seemingly focus-
ing on maximizing the number of cases that can reasonably be
prosecuted given the limited resources and time frame to which they
must practically adhere.
Second, the circular logic of the SCSL budget-that it must at once
depend on funding to succeed, but it must succeed in order to attract
funding-detracted from its efficiency in ways the main organs of the
Court could not prevent. In fact, the slow speed of trials in the beginning
stages of the SCSL's work was "largely due to funding issues."203 Slower
199. Skilbeck, supra note 179, at 6.
200. Erik Mose & Ccile Aptel, Trial Without Undue Delay Before the International
Criminal Tribunals, in MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN 539, 549-50 (Lal Chand Vohrah et al.
eds., 2003).
201. The time limits on hybrid tribunals aim to "avoid the massive costs and delay that
plagued the ICTY and ICTR." Lindsey Raub, Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International
Criminal Justice, 41 INT'L L. & PoLITics 1014, 1023-24.
202. Dominic Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and its Completion Strategy; Efforts to Achieve
Accountability for War Crimes and their Tribunals, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 82, 89 (2005).
203. CHATHAM HOUSE, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE AND How IT WILL
END 3 (2007).
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trials in the beginning result in longer trials in the end and, ultimately,
higher costs.204 This type of system fails to take advantage of economies
of scale arising from the art of learning by doing. By the time the tribu-
nal could have ramped up its prosecutions, it was regrettably expected to
start drawing down its operations because of lack of funding and the Se-
curity Council imposed completion strategy.
Third, the SCSL, having primacy only over the national courts of Si-
erra Leone, lacked adequate enforcement or cooperation mechanisms
with third party states. Its weak cooperation model, under which coun-
tries would voluntarily have to accept requests from the Court, could
even be blamed (as argued by Norman's family) for failing to secure
state support to the point that it could not offer adequate medical support
to those indicted and in its custody.205 With even the modest mechanisms
to ensure state cooperation available to the ICTRICTY because of the
Security Council's power to take measures to ensure the maintenance of
international peace and security under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
the Court might have secured the necessary evidence, witnesses, and
arrest of the accused much earlier.
In retrospect, it may be that it was wrong for the international com-
munity and Sierra Leoneans to herald the SCSL as offering a new brand of
justice. It is also now obvious that with its limited judicial mandate, it
should not have been expected to serve as the key player in the transitional
justice process of a barely functional post-conflict Sierra Leone. Its mere
existence did not spring forth a magic potion to wipe out the impunity ef-
fects of the wartime atrocities. Yet, many in the international community
supported the Court at the expense of the truth commission. The apparent
conventional wisdom driving those attitudes was the idea that the former,
rather than the latter, held greater prospects for the country's future. Some
did not even appreciate that the truth commission was an equally impor-
tant partner in Sierra Leone's battle against impunity.
At the end of the day, though there is an obvious misalignment be-
tween expectations and end results, the actual number of fair trials that
the SCSL bequeaths to Sierra Leone will be the concrete indicator by
which its achievements will be judged. Indeed, though the Court was
204. Id. at 2 ("If financial shortages do arise, these may result in a delay in proceedings
which means that the total costs at the end of the day are higher.").
205. Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring, supra note 101, at 636.
206. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
207. For an assessment of the tension in the relationship between the two institutions by
a close observer, see William A. Schabas, Internationalized Courts and their Relationship with
Alternative Accountability Mechanisms: The Case of Sierra Leone, in INTERNATIONALIZED
CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA
157, 179-80 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2004).
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perhaps slow in its prosecutions, the very idea of prioritizing speed and
efficiency over deliberation and justice carries the inherent prospect that
the two imperatives may collide.3 8 Yet, as one distinguished international
law scholar has suggested, to local war-weary communities, the yard-
stick of success for such criminal tribunals, or the lack thereof, will often
be gauged by "palpable," tangible factors.20 High theories of justice as to
what can, could, or should have been achieved will likely gain little, if
any, traction.
D. Limited Support for the Defense Office
The credibility and integrity of the SCSL depends, at least partially,
on the accused party's access to fair trial rights. 2'0 Each of the accused
benefited, albeit to different degrees, from Article 17 of the Statute of the
Court. That provision guaranteed them, among other rights, the right to
be presumed innocent and to a fair and public hearing before an impar-
tial tribunal. It also contained certain minimum guarantees. These
include the right to counsel, to adequate time and facilities to prepare the
defense, and the right to cross-examine witnesses under the same condi-
tions as witnesses for the prosecution. 21' The language and substance of
that provision, borrowed from the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,2 2 is now a standard part of fair trial clauses in the stat-
utes of all international criminal tribunals.213
The problem is that, with the exception of the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, in the SCSL, as in other ad hoc international or international-
ized criminal courts, the Statute of the Court failed to specify which
organ ought to be primarily responsible for ensuring the protection of the
rights of the accused and the defense more generally.214 In fact, it was
208. As one commentary on the ICTY points out, the Prosecutor, acting under the com-
pletion strategy, faced new challenges: "Conscious of the need to ensure that the ICTY has not
omitted investigation of any of the most serious crimes committed-by or against any particu-
lar ethnic or religious group-the Completion Strategy has placed a significant additional
pressure on the current Prosecutor that her predecessors did not face." Raab, supra note 202,
at 90.
209. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 50 VA. J.
INT'L L. 269, 310 (2010).
210. Wolfgang Schomburg, The Role of the International Criminal Tribunals in Promot-
ing Respect for Fair Trial Rights, 8 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 1, 1 (2009).
211. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 17, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S.
145.
212. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 9(3), 14, Mar. 23, 1976,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
213. Schomburg, supra note 210, at 2.
214. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 17, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S.
145 (referring to each of the rights using some variation of the phrase: "[t]he accused shall"
437
Michigan Journal of International Law
only on the eve of the arrests that the Management Committee and the
Plenary of Judges, realizing the limitations inherent in asking the Regis-
trar-an otherwise neutral administrator-to fulfill this protective role,
decided to create the Defense Office.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence directed the Regis-
trar to "establish, maintain and develop a Defence Office, for the purpose
of ensuring the rights of suspects and accused" persons before the
Court.2 5 Part of the motivation was to ensure that the accused would not
be arraigned before the SCSL without some provision for them to be
represented by independent counsel. 26 The other imperative was the
overarching concern with reducing costs in light of the limited budget
and prohibitive legal fees associated with providing legal aid in the
ICTY and ICTR.2 7
Rule 45(B) therefore anticipated an office that had mixed functions,
which reflected these mixed objectives. The Defense Office was asked to
provide, among other things, initial legal advice and assistance through
appointed counsel situated within a reasonable proximity of the deten-
tion facility; legal assistance as ordered by the Court if the accused does
not have sufficient means; and adequate facilities for counsel to use in
the preparation of the defense.
The unprecedented and innovative Defense Office was initially con-
ceived of as a semi-autonomous subunit within the Registry. However, in
reality, it lacked the necessary autonomy to actually fulfill its immense
potential. It was envisaged, at least by some court officials, that the of-
fice could eventually become as independent as the Office of the
Prosecutor.' Still, efforts by Simone Monasebian, the first Principal
without specifying duties of any organs of the Court to protect these rights); Prosecutor v.
Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-AR73, Decision on Brima-Kamara De-
fence Appeal Motion Against Trial Chamber II Majority Decision on Extremely Urgent
Confidential Joint Motion for the Re-Appointment of Kevin Metzger and Wilbert Harris as
Lead Counsel for Alex Tamba Brima and Brima Bazzy Kamara, I 82, 84 (Dec. 8, 2005),
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=eeT9jDO%2byAg%3d&tabid=197 (inferring
that according to the Statute, no organ carries the responsibility for ensuring the rights of the
accused, but rather it must be "a common duty shared by the three organs").
215. R. P. & EvID., Special Court for Sierra Leone, available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=zXPrwoukovM%3d&tabid=176.
216. Jalloh, The Contribution of the SCSL, supra note 31, at 180 ("The establishment of
the Defence Office in the SCSL was partly motivated by the judges' concern to preside over
fair trials.").
217. Id.
218. PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, supra note 48, at 17 (not-
ing the "Registrar's intention that the Office will, in the future, become as fully independent as
the OTP"). The office originated from a proposal by Judge Geoffrey Robertson, the SCSL's
first President. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-AR73,
Separate and Concurring Opinion of Justice Robertson on the Decision on Brima-Kamara
Defence Appeal Motion Against Trial Chamber H Majority Decision on Extremely Urgent
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Defender of the SCSL, to convince the parties to make amendments to
the instruments of the Court to achieve this conception of an independent
office proved futile. These efforts were resuscitated by Vincent Nme-
hielle, the second Principal Defender, but were also unsuccessful. As the
SCSL nears the completion of all its trials, with a Defense Office that is
now no more than a shadow of its former self, it seems unlikely that it
will accomplish its grand vision of becoming the "fourth pillar" of the
Court.219
Its dependence on the Registrar also limited its role and hindered its
ability to provide adequate facilities for counsel in the preparation of the
defense in the AFRC, CDF, and RUF Trials. 220 This outcome was not in-
evitable. Indeed, by around March 2003, when the first five accused
were transferred to the SCSL's custody, the Defense Office had already
begun to carry out its main responsibilities. It offered initial legal advice
and representation to the accused, developed a list of counsel, and ap-
pointed and contracted generally competent counsel for the various
indictees. Even after counsel was assigned, the lawyers in the office con-
tinued to assist the defense counsel generally by monitoring the progress
of the trials, providing some legal research assistance, and arguing mat-
ters of common interest. It also sought to create working relationships
221
with governments and NGOs to address defense concerns.
In advocating the interests of the accused, the Defense Office took
responsibility for crucial detention issues that had the potential to impact
defendants' participation in hearings and court processes, and therefore,
their fair trial rights. It fell to lawyers in the office to address this lacuna
in representation because, due to funding constraints, defense counsel
were not paid to deal with detention matters.
The Defense Office also represented defense interests in the plenary
meetings of the Court's judges, wherein rule changes were adopted,
Confidential Joint Motion for the Re-Appointment of Kevin Metzger and Wilbert Harris as
Lead Counsel for Alex Tamba Brima and Brima Bazzy Kamara, 1 88, 102(viii) (Nov. 8,
2005), http://www.sc-s.org/LinkClickaspx?fileticket=cwdREgToCtM%3d&tabid=197.
219. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Separate and Concurring Opinion of Justice
Robertson on the Decision on Brima-Kamara Defence Appeal Motion Against Trial Chamber
II Majority Decision on Extremely Urgent Confidential Joint Motion for the Re-Appointment
of Kevin Metzger and Wilbert Harris as Lead Counsel for Alex Tamba Brima and Brima
Bazzy Kamara, 88.
220. Cassese, supra note 2, 136.
221. Vincent 0. Nmehielle, Position Paper on the Independence of the Office of the
Principal Defender at Special Court for Sierra Leone 4 [hereinafter Position Paper] (on file
with the author) (submitted to the Management Committee of the SCSL by Vincent 0. Nine-
hielle, Principal Defender).
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sometimes at the behest of the Prosecutor.22 Similarly, it played a role in
outreach to Sierra Leoneans by helping to educate them about the pre-
sumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial. In a country that was
still reeling from the trauma and devastating impact of a savage war, this
was important given the popular perception that the accused were guilty
221before they were even tried.
While the foregoing discussion largely reflects the Defense Office's
conception of its role, even during its heyday, this assessment was sub-
ject to much controversy." The Court and some assigned counsel
questioned the usefulness of the office's work, especially as conflicts
arose between it and defense lawyers over issues of whether its lawyers
could represent accused persons.2 2 The office also struggled to keep
costs down within the provision of the legal services contract, which was
based on a fixed, lump sum system. It made enemies with defense coun-
sel in the process, as it sought to administer a modest budget that was
probably among the lowest ever allocated for the cost of legal aid for
accused persons in any modem ad hoc international criminal tribunal.
E. Inequality ofArms Between the Prosecution and Defense
The principle of equality of arms, a now established international
criminal law norm, requires that neither the Prosecution nor the Defense
suffer such that there is a substantial or material disadvantage in the
preparation and presentation of their respective cases vis-A-vis their op-
ponent.226 As the trials wrapped up in Freetown, insufficient investigative
resources, inadequate staffing levels, inadequate funds, and unequal ac-
cess to other resources such as vehicles and offices "all greatly
222. Id. ("Furthermore, the Defence Office represents works in the interest of the De-
fence in all other official matters before the Special Court, including issues raised at the
plenary sessions organized by the Judges of the Special Court.").
223. Jones et al., supra note 167, at 215 ("It is a sad fact that many of the persons de-
tained at the Special Court's facility in Bonthe are 'presumed guilty' by popular opinion. This
has to be reversed if they are to receive fair trials.").
224. For a critique that was contested by the Defence Office, see ALIsoN THOMPSON &
MICHELLE STAGGS, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY WAR CRIMES STUDIES CTR., THE DEFENCE
OFFICE AT THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: A CRITICAL PERSPEcTIVE 25 (2007).
225. Id. at 40-42 (citing Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T,
Written Reasons for the Decision on Application by Counsel for the Third Accused to With-
draw from the Case (June 19, 2006)).
226. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment
(Reasons), In 63-71 (June 1, 2001), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/O/Case%5CEnglish%
5CKayishemaF%5Cdecisions%5Cindex.pdf; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. ICTY-95-
14/1-AR73, Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, TI 24-25
(Feb. 16, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acdec/en/90216EV36313.htm.
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contribute[d] to the quality of the Defense mounted at the Special
Court."227
With the exception of the Taylor case, which avoided the same fate
due to a combination of factors including the courageous gamble of the
accused, his provisionally assigned counsel, and the Defense Office, the
shoestring budget of the SCSL had the effect of severely limiting the
amount of funding available to each of the legal defense teams. As dona-
tions to the Court started drying up, budgetary cutbacks left the defense
counsel with drastically reduced budgets on the eve of beginning the de-
fense phases of their cases in Freetown. The cutbacks included monies
for staffing costs for additional counsel, investigators, legal assistants,
* 228
and military and other experts.
In general, the facilities allocated to the Defense were also a stark
contrast to those provided to the Prosecution. 229 Arguably, of course, it is
the latter, rather than the former, that should have more resources be-
cause it carries the burden of proving the case beyond a reasonable
doubt. While the burden for the defense is only to raise a reasonable
doubt, the fact that the two sides work essentially the same case, albeit
from different perspectives, suggests that this argument is not as strong
as it might initially appear.
At the SCSL, the inequality of resources between the two sides led to
tangible differences in terms of access to offices, equipment, and money
for local and international investigators and experts to assist the various
defense teams.230 In some cases, defense lawyers were so frustrated that
they filed motions seeking orders directing the Registrar and the Defense
Office to provide basic facilities like a computer, an extra office, or a
vehicle for the defense team.231 In this fiscally tight environment, lead
227. THOMPSON & STAGGS, supra note 224, at 28. See also HRW, supra note 126, at 23.
228. Position Paper, supra note 221, at 6.
229. For example:
The Defence Office and its Assigned Counsel as well as the Investigators and in-
terns, occupy one and a half blocks of 7 containers with 14 offices. Inevitably, staff
members and also team members share a room, which are not conducive working
conditions. On the contrary, the Prosecutor's Office has 4 blocks of 54 containers in
total.
Id. at 7.
230. HRW, supra note 126, at 26.
231. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on Sesay
Defence Application I-Logistical Resources, 4-5 (Jan. 24, 2007), http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=XuzmFRMpvl4%3d&tabid=155 (ordering a second office,
furnished with a desk, a second networked computer, a vehicle, and a witness management
officer); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on Defence
Application II, 28 (Feb. 28, 2007), http://www.sc-st.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
WfZ3Y3cMpBk%3d&tabid=155 (dismissed in its entirety for the Court's lack of jurisdiction).
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international counsel were periodically forced to delegate duties to less
experienced legal assistants in Freetown. While some of the case-related
issues would have been better dealt with by the lead counsel, they often
did not have adequate travel budgets for trips between their home bases
(in Europe and North America) and the seat of the Court in Sierra
12Leone. This sometimes meant that counsel sought the right of audience
for Freetown-based legal assistants that, because of their level of experi-
ence, the trial judges could not accept.
In short, a major shortcoming of the SCSL derived from the lack of
an effective Defense Office with autonomy to make decisions in the in-
terests of justice. Worse yet was the lack of adequate resources for the
defense. That, in turn, came about largely because of the Court's shoe-
string budget. Indeed, it was widely known that the administrators of the
SCSL were at times so cash strapped that they were not sure where the
next funds, including basic operating costs such as staff salaries for the
next month, would come from. 233 A justice institution with the noblest of
goals should not be forced to endure such indignity.23 4
An independent and well-resourced office would have more
efficiently and effectively achieved its mandate at the Court. The
Registry and Defense Office were basically driven by different
imperatives. The former was fixated on keeping costs down. The latter
sought to represent only the interests of the accused and justice. As
individuals suspected of international crimes are not necessarily the most
sympathetic of figures, even among the judges, the defense counsel were
dependent solely upon what meager resources the Registry allocated for
235the Defense Office to disburse to them as contractors.
232. HRW, supra note 126, at 7. See also Position Paper, supra note 221, at 5 (noting
that the budget is insufficient to meet Defense demands, including for witness support in the
field, thus resulting in an impediment to the protection of the rights of the accused).
233. Officials from UN-Backed Court Appeal for Resources to Finish Sierra Leone Tri-
als, U.N. DAILY NEWS, July 16, 2009, at 5-6 (quoting Prosecutor Rapp in characterizing the
Court's financial situation as "an impending crisis"). See also U.N. SCOR, 62d Sess., 5708th
mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5708 (June 28, 2007) (presenting the Security Council statement
urging the international community to support the Court, and noting the ongoing need for
financial support).
234. See Dougherty, supra note 100, at 326.
235. Position Paper, supra note 221, at 8. See also Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu,
Case No. SCSL-2004-16-AR73, Decision on Brima-Kamara Defence Appeal Motion Against
Trial Chamber I Majority Decision on Extremely Urgent Confidential Joint Motion for the
Re-Appointment of Kevin Metzger and Wilbert Harris as Lead Counsel for Alex Tamba
Brima and Brima Bazzy Kamara, In 80-86 (Dec. 8, 2005), http://www.sc-sl.org/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=eeT9jDO%2byAg%3d&tabid=197 (mapping out the different,
overlapping, and distinct duties of the Defense Office and the Registrar, and the repartition
envisioned by Rule 45, and noting that, although assignment of Counsel is a responsibility
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In practice, this meant that, from the perspective of the Defense
Office, if more resources were needed to mount a proper defense, then
that was what the legal aid administrators would recommend to the chief
administrator and purser of the tribunal. The Registrar, who would
receive such recommendations and decide on them, was by definition
conflicted. Why? His goal was to keep costs down to a minimum, and
crucially, within the estimated budget that had been contracted for. This
was the case irrespective of the specific and often changing or
unforeseen requirements of a particular case. It therefore was inherently
contradictory that the two bodies, with such divergent interests and
views, were lumped together in the first place.
Further, the Office's lack of autonomy implied that when defense
lawyers disputed as inadequate the budgetary allocations for the defense
before the trial chamber, the office-which was ostensibly created to
defend defense rights-would be asked to compromise its position to
make arguments in favor of the Registrar who invariably opposed such
applications.236 Yet, on many occasions and sometimes unbeknownst to
defense attorneys, the Defense Office would have administratively raised
with the Registrar the same complaints regarding the need for more
funding for defense teams. Thus, the office would often be caught in be-
tween a rock and a hard place: on the one hand, the bosses in the
Registry that direct its major decisions, and on the other hand, the pri-
vately contracted defense counsel.
Even worse, when the lawyers would take their frustrations to their
clients, most of the accused, who had much at stake, understandably
sided with their counsel and maligned the office as the enemy in cahoots
with the administration to undermine their fair trial rights. By the begin-
ning of the defense phase of the trials, the office was trapped in a vicious
lose-lose spiral without any tangible prospects of breaking out of it.
Although dispensing justice and ending impunity in Sierra Leone
were undoubtedly laudable goals, the SCSL was, in practice, so con-
strained by the general lack of funding237 that its treatment of the accused
and defense rights gave the unfortunate impression of being setup with
solely in the province of the Defense Office, "the Registrar did not divest himself of his pow-
er" to act in such matters and "can therefore act concurrently with the Principal Defender").
236. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. See also Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon &
Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on Sesay Defence Application I-Logistical Re-
sources, 3 (noting the response application by the Registrar); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon &
Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on Defence Application II, 1 10-13 (describing the
joint reply by the Defense Office and the Registry).
237. See Dougherty, supra note 100, at 324 (quoting an interview with Registrar Robert
Vincent in which he lamented, "the SCSL is not lean and mean, it is anorexic").
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the sole purpose to convict.23 Yet, conviction was not the only goal of
President Kabbah or the Security Council-both of whom wanted credi-
ble justice dispensed in accordance with the highest fair trial
requirements of international human rights law.
As a result, this experience will undermine the perception of the
Court's positive legacy in Sierra Leone. It may not necessarily be seen as
a model of fairness for the ailing national justice system."' Indeed, if a
positive lesson can be gleaned from the treatment of the defense, it is the
reality that, based on the Sierra Leonean experience, the Security Coun-
cil established a fully autonomous defense office in the recently
established Lebanon Tribunal-the first of its kind in the history of in-
ternational criminal law.'
IV. DID THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE BRING JUSTICE,
PEACE, AND RECONCILIATION TO SIERRA LEONE?
Having examined its intended role at its creation, as well as the
background to its cases and some of its key limitations, the only remain-
ing task of this Article is to assess the positive impact, achievements, and
contributions of the Court to the challenge of achieving justice through
prosecutions and the targeting of the culture of impunity in Sierra Leone.
In this regard, the first question that arises is whether the SCSL has
prosecuted those leaders deemed to bear the greatest responsibility for
the grave crimes perpetrated in Sierra Leone during the latter half of the
1990s, consistent with the primary objective of the GoSL and the Secu-
rity Council. If so, the next question is whether those trials were
238. See Wayne Jordash & Scott Martin, Due Process and Fair Trial Rights at the Spe-
cial Court: How the Desire for Accountability Outweighed the Demands of Justice at the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 23 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 585, 587, 608 (2010) (noting that there
are aspects of the trial just as important as "the final tally of convictions" and critiquing how
the types of "demonstrably unsafe convictions may well satisfy those focused only on the
immediate policy objectives defined by the need to bring accountability to war-tom coun-
tries"). Romano provides a report of major international law institutions. His diagnosis of the
SCSL includes firstly that the Court demonstrated that voluntary contributions are neither
sustainable nor feasible. Secondly, he affirms and restates the Secretary-General's initial con-
cern in setting up a court based on this funding system. That is, "without long-term assurances
of the continuous availability of funds, risks in terms of moral responsibility, loss of credibility
of the UN and exposure to legal liability, are very high.' Romano, supra note 168, at 298.
239. Analogous arguments have been made against shoestring budgets of other interna-
tional criminal institutions. With regard to the East Timor and Kosovo Tribunals, for instance,
Romano argues that the obsession with cheaper trials has led to the shortsighted and frail
conception that "'a little prosecution is better than nothing."' Romano, supra note 168, at
301. This is especially weak logic, as he points out, on which to "rebuild the judiciary of those
war-torn regions." Id. at 302.
240. Jalloh, The Contribution of the SCSL, supra note 31, at 180.
444 [Vol. 32:395
Spring 2011] Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?
conducted in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness,
and due process of law.
A. Justice and Overall Fairness of the Trials
In response to the first of these two issues, at a general level, it
seems clear that the SCSL has achieved some of its core mandate. That
is, it has brought members of the RUF leadership and some of their
collaborators (the AFRC) to justice through independent prosecutions.
The Court convicted six military leaders who were personally found to
have committed, or gave orders for others to commit, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and serious violations of international
humanitarian law in Sierra Leone after November 30, 1996. Included are
convictions for controversial charges of novel gender crimes in the form
of "forced marriage."" Similarly, the SCSL also successfully prosecuted
crimes in connection with child recruitment as a violation of customary
international law as well as in respect of rebel attacks on U.N.
peacekeepers. Both were firsts in the history of international criminal
law. 242
Recall that President Kabbah's principal objective in requesting in-
ternational support for the Court was to ensure that the RUF leadership
and their accomplices were brought to justice.243 Clearly, though not
every leader of that rebel organization was prosecuted, at least some of
the mid to high level leaders have been. The SCSL may have also ex-
ceeded expectations in prosecuting additional offenders, in particular the
two CDF leaders (Fofana and Kondewa) though, as I argued earlier, this
also proved to be a controversial decision-at least within Sierra Leone.
In short, many observers who have followed the work of the Court from
its earliest days to these twilight days may not begrudge it this generally
positive assessment of its disposition of those cases.
Similarly, with respect to the second question (which relates to the
overall fairness of trial proceedings), many commentators would proba-
bly agree that, overall, the SCSL also succeeded in holding fair trials that
241. For further commentary, see Micaela Frulli, Advancing International Criminal
Law: The Special Court for Sierra Leone Recognizes Forced Marriage as a "New" Crime
Against Humanity, 2 J. INT'L CIM. JUST. 1033-42 (2004) (noting that the Special Court for
Sierra Leone recognized that forced marriage may amount to a crime against humanity as an
"other inhumane act"); Valerie Oosterveld, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Child Re-
cruitment and Forced Marriage: Providing Clarity or Confusion?, 45 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 131,
168-71 (2007).
242. For a prosecution perspective on prosecuting the crime of attacking U.N. peace-
keepers, see Mohamed A. Bangura, Prosecuting the Crime of Attack on Peacekeepers: A
Prosecutor's Challenge, 23 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 165, 174 (2010).
243. Kabbah Letter to UNSC, supra note 3, at 2.
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were generally consistent with international standards of justice, fair-
ness, and due process of law.244
This is not to suggest that the Court is above criticism in various ar-
eas.245 For instance, as shown in Part III, numerous complaints can be
made regarding the SCSL's treatment of the rights of the accused and the
limited institutional support and funding provided to the defense during
the Freetown trials. Though important in addressing the disproportion-
ately gendered burden of the war on Sierra Leonean women, from a
defense perspective, the successful convictions discussed above left seri-
ous concerns about the level of commitment to the principle of
non-retroactive application of law and the right of the accused to a fair
trial as specified in the statute and international human rights law.
B. Failed Expectations of Efficient and Expeditious Trials
The SCSL was specifically designed to improve on the trial effi-
ciency of the ICTR and ICTY.24 At its creation, it was widely hailed as a
model or benchmark for the assessment of future ad hoc international
criminal courts.247 Against this backdrop, we should inquire whether the
Court has fulfilled some of those high expectations. In other words, did
it conduct its limited trials in a manner that is not only more efficient but
also relatively less costly in comparison with other ad hoc international
penal tribunals?
According to the American founding Prosecutor of the SCSL, David
Crane, who oversaw the early investigations and prepared all of the
Court's indictments:
We have shown the world that international criminal justice can
be done within budget, within a specific time frame and be very
effective in targeting those who they are mandated to prosecute
244. Consider, for instance, the Court's commitment to impartial proceedings as exem-
plified by the decision of the majority of the Appeals Chamber to disqualify an influential
sitting judge. See Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR15, Decision on Defence
Motion Seeking the Disqualification of Justice Robertson from the Appeals Chamber
(Mar. 13, 2004), http://www.sc-sL.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uabm35HcOjg%3d&tabid
=195. For commentary, see James Cockayne, Special Court for Sierra Leone Decisions on the
Recusal of Judges Robertson and Winter, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1154, 1161-62 (2004) (sug-
gesting that the dismissal of judges actually has negative implications for impartiality). Contra
Jordash & Martin, supra note 238, at 607-08.
245. Cassese, supra note 2, IN 16, 35 (assessing and criticizing the judicial output and
lack of productivity at the Court). See also The Price of Healing, ALL AFR., Aug. 4, 2006,
http://www.ictj.org/en/news/coverage/article/990.html; Penfold, supra note 131 (criticizing the
expense of justice at the SCSL).
246. Cassese, supra note 2,1 2.
247. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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... the Special Court in Sierra Leone is showing that interna-
tional criminal justice can be done efficiently and effectively.'
Though the Prosecution ultimately succeeded in achieving a guilty ver-
dict for each of the individuals that it charged and tried in Freetown, as
will be discussed next, the claim that the Court's trials were conducted
with expediency and efficiency is highly debatable.
Following a study of the SCSL commissioned by U.N. Secretary-
General Annan, former ICTY President Antonio Cassese wrote an inde-
pendent expert report confirming as much.4 ' He found that, in addition
to the general insecurity arising from the voluntary funding system, the
SCSL suffered from a lack of strong judicial leadership. 25 0 It also rein-
vented the wheel by failing to draw lessons from the available
experience in conducting criminal proceedings in other international
criminal tribunals.251 ln his assessment, even if the Court were to have
completed all of its three (now four) trials between mid-2002 and the
end of 2009 (which did not occur because, as noted earlier, the Taylor
Case still continues), the overall level of efficiency of the SCSL trials "is
not a significant improvement on the record of the ICTR or ICTY, which
within a comparable time frame tried many more accused, albeit with
more [j]udges, staff, and resources."252 This language implies that Judge
Cassese considered this record to be somewhat of an improvement over
existing ad hoc tribunals, even if it fell short of widespread expectations.
Nevertheless, the Court could and should have done a better job with
the pace of its trials. This is particularly so given the roughly $212
248. Cobb, supra note 124. See also Crane, Dancing with the Devil, supra note 144, at 2
(noting that the SCSL showed that international criminal law could be efficient); Crane, Ter-
rorists, Warlords, and Thugs, supra note 48, at 516 ("International criminal justice can be
effectively and efficiently delivered within a politically acceptable time frame. ... [T]he Spe-
cial Court for Sierra Leone ... has shown that it can be done."). But see David Crane, Justice
for Freetown: The Sierra Leone War Crimes Verdicts, JURIsT, June 25, 2007, http://
jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/06/justice-for-freetown-sierra-leone-war.php ("Justice is never
perfect, efficient, nor at times swift; but it surely can bring hope, some reconciliation for vic-
tims, and the possibility of a sustainable peace.").
249. Cassese, supra note 2, 6, 14 ("[The Independent Expert] shall scrutinize the
operation and functioning of the Court 'with the objective of ensuring the most efficient use of
the Court's resources and the completion of the Court's work in a timely manner while at the
same time maintaining the highest standards of fairness, due process and respect for human
rights' . . . conducting 'an assessment of judicial output and productivity, the efficient use of
courtroom space and resources and factors influencing the duration of judicial proceed-
ings.'").
250. Id. 6.
251. Id. 54.
252. Id. 15.
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million that it has reportedly expended so far.13 While this amount pales
in comparison to the much higher (billion dollar plus) expenditures of
the ICTY and ICTR, it takes on new meaning in the Sierra Leonean con-
text. Imagine an alternative possibility that the Kabbah Government
appeared to initially float, whereby the tribunal's trials would have been
held in a special crimes chamber of the national court system of Sierra
Leone.' 5 Planned and implemented well, such a hybrid system might
have led to greater success vis-A-vis the current SCSL model.
This alternative is admittedly fraught with difficulty, as the East Ti-
mor and Kosovo hybrid courts suggest. The U.N. Transitional
Administration in East Timor established the Special Panels for Serious
Crimes within the new domestic justice system following that country's
independence from Indonesia.26 Though solely a U.N.-run operation, the
trials were marred with difficulty and achieved limited success because
253. Craig Timberg, Sierra Leone Special Court's Narrow Focus: Well-Funded But
Selective War Crimes Probe Draws Resentment of Impoverished Victims, WASH. POST,
Mar. 26, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/25/AR20080
32503156.html ("By the time the court finishes its work in 2010, the total cost is projected to
reach $212 million-a massive sum for a country that the United Nations ranks as the least
developed in the world."). My calculations lead to an estimate of $222.9 million for the SCSL,
calculated based on the expenditures of the SCSL as provided in the First through Fourth An-
nual Reports covering July 2002 through December 2006. PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT
FOR SIERRA LEONE, supra note 48, at 36 (reporting actual expenditures from July 2002-June
2003); PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, SECOND ANNUAL REP. OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 41 (2005) (reporting actual expendi-
tures from July 2003-June 2004); PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE,
THIRD ANNUAL REP. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 46
(2006) (reporting actual expenditures from July 2004-June 2005); PRESIDENT OF THE
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, FOURTH ANNUAL REP. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 63 (2007) (reporting actual expenditures from July 2005-
December 2006). Because the Fifth and Sixth Annual Reports did not include actual expendi-
tures, I instead used the total contributions for 2007 and 2008 in place of expenditures.
PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 61 (2008) (reporting on contributions
made from January-December 2007); PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE,
SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 66
(2009) (reporting on contributions made from January-December 2008). As the Seventh An-
nual Report does not provide actual expenditures or contributions, I used the approved budgets
for 2009 and 2010. PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, SEVENTH AN-
NUAL REP. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 38 (2010)
(reporting the approved organizational costs for January 2009-December 2010).
254. See discussion supra Part III.C. (describing the significance of a shoestring budget
in the context of the SCSL).
255. See Kabbah Letter to UNSC, supra note 3, at 3-5.
256. See Sylvia de Bertodano, East Timor: Trials and Tribulations, in INTERNATIONAL-
IZED CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, Kosovo, AND
CAMBODIA, supra note 207, at 79, 96; Suzannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra
Leone: Experiments in International Justice, 12 CRIM. L.F. 185, 206-07 (2001).
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of poor management, lack of funding, experienced personnel, and politi-
cal will.57
Similarly, the Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court was created by
the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.25 3 It was felt that
incorporating international prosecutors and judges into the existing sys-
tem would improve the chances of impartiality in rendering justice while
bringing to bear international skills and knowledge for the benefit of the
local justice system. The experiment largely failed because of poor de-
sign and a lack of funds and capacity to implement it successfully."
Still, in the Sierra Leonean situation, a carefully designed hybrid
could have helped the founders of the SCSL better achieve their stated
secondary objective of helping to rebuild the rule of law and the battered
national justice system while generally keeping costs down.'6 In turn,
this would have likely resulted in other worthy benefits like improving
the country's judicial capacity, as well as its legislative and human re-
2611
sources to prosecute both domestic and international crimes.
It is easy to take the moral high ground and to argue that justice can-
not, and should not, be measured in dollars and cents.262 Indeed, many
say just that.263 And that may be true at a conceptual level. But, in a
world where every dollar and every cent must be fairly accounted for by
the Court to its donors and the populace for whose benefit it was primar-
ily established, the cost of approximately $23 million per trial is perhaps
too high. Context also matters. The entire justice sector in Sierra Leone
operates on less than $1 million each year,2' a fraction of the estimated
257. See Bertodano, supra note 256, at 96; Linton, supra note 256, at 206-07.
258. John Cerone & Clive Baldwin, Explaining and Evaluating the UNMIK Court Sys-
tem, in INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST
TIMOR, Kosovo, AND CAMBODIA, supra note 207, at 41.
259. Jean-Christian Cady & Nicholas Booth, International Courts in Kosovo: An
UNMIK Perspective, in INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: SIERRA
LEONE, EAST TIMOR, Kosovo, AND CAMBODIA, supra note 207, at 59,60.
260. S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 14, pmbl. 19 (stating the objectives of the Court).
261. See William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law En-
forcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEx. INT'L L.J. 729, 760 (2003) (noting that
regional enforcement mechanisms generally may "have greater legitimacy within affected
communities").
262. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 209, at 317 ("From both an ethical and moral per-
spective, there is no price tag for doing what is right.").
263. David Wippman, The Costs of International Justice, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 861, 863
(2006) (quoting the famous judge of the Oklahoma City bombing case: "We don't use a cost-
benefit analysis in deciding what's necessary for a fair trial"); Interview by Angela Stavrianou
with Joseph Kamara, Former Acting Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in the
Hague, Neth. (Mar. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Joseph Kamara Interview] ("You cannot put a price
on peace, and you cannot put a price on justice.").
264. Supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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cost of a single trial prosecuted before the Court. Assuming costs re-
mained stable, this would work out to about twenty-three years worth of
expenditures, including all criminal trials and other justice-related ex-
penses in the national system. Thus, it is not surprising to hear that many
Sierra Leoneans consider the overall cost of the SCSL too high a price to
pay for what they received in return.265
On these facts, it would seem hard to convince the people of Sierra
Leone that the Court was a good value for the money. Yet further qualifi-
cations must be added. For instance, it appears that many people in the
country misapprehend the situation and incorrectly conduct a cost-
benefit analysis between the SCSL and the provision of desperately
needed facilities like roads and schools. While the involvement of the
United Nations in creating the Court undoubtedly generated high and
unrealistic expectations for what might be accomplished, this compari-
son may be a false one for two reasons.
First, the SCSL is not a failed development project. Rather, it is an
independent justice project in its own right. It has its own inherent value,
albeit hard to translate into actual dollars and cents. What is more, the
Court did enjoy-at least initially-popular support among war-weary
locals. In fact, it is common knowledge that Sierra Leonean civil society
played an important role in advocating for the establishment of a crimi-
nal tribunal to prosecute the crimes that occurred during the war. At the
time that the government granted all combatants amnesty in return for
peace in July 1999, human rights groups were the loudest groups oppos-
ing the idea. It was against such a backdrop that the democratically
elected Kabbah Government requested international community support
for a special tribunal in the name of the people of Sierra Leone.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, nothing was foregone when
the SCSL was established. There is no global or U.N. fund that was
tapped for money to fund the Court. Rather, the SCSL raised every dol-
lar, dime, and cent that it has spent. Moreover, it is an open secret that it
has had difficulty raising funds for its most basic operating expenses. For
this reason, among others, it would appear highly unlikely that, even
without the creation of the tribunal, the money that was spent on the
Court would have ended up in the impoverished country to fund devel-
265. See Umaru Fofana, Did Sierra Leone Get War Crimes Justice?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 6,
2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilafrica/8345618.stm ("[Flor the scarred victims of the war
struggling to feed or educate their children, the many millions of dollars that has been spent
on bringing about that justice could have been better spent.... But for Binta Mansaray, the
court's Sierra Leonean-born acting registrar, the money was worth it. She says the money
spent on the court does not come anywhere near the lives and resources that would have been
wasted if the war had continued.").
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opment projects or other things deemed more desirable by Sierra Leone-
ans. In any event, it may be that for the survivors of mass atrocities, the
struggle to eke out a living today appears to simply outweigh the (fad-
ing) Kantian imperative of receiving justice for what happened
yesterday. Perhaps this is inevitable in an impoverished country like Si-
erra Leone, which has been repeatedly ranked as the poorest in the
world.2%
Judge Cassese's overall assessment of the slowness of SCSL trials is
significant not only from the perspective of efficiency and cost, but also
given the right of all accused persons to a trial without undue delay, as
specified in Article 17(4)(c) of the Court's Statute. The length of time
demanded for such complex trials might interfere with the rights of the
accused who are incarcerated without any bail during the proceedings.
Excessively lengthy pre-trial detention may also violate the presumption
of innocence, to which everyone is entitled, especially those accused of
*267
serious international crimes.
C. Lasting Peace and the Deterrence Value of the SCSL
One of the added values of international criminal tribunals is that
they appear to help create the political and legal conditions under which
dangerous individuals can be legitimately removed or isolated from so-
ciety. Not only is the incarcerated person unable to commit more crimes
while detained (specific deterrence), incarceration also helps to discour-
age others from committing similar crimes (general deterrence). Often,
the procedural guarantees of due process serve to confer legitimacy on
the decision to remove the person from society, thereby depoliticizing
the decision, at least to some extent.
It will be recalled that the founders of the SCSL felt that, in the par-
ticular circumstances of Sierra Leone, the prosecution of those
responsible for serious atrocities would contribute to the restoration of
lasting peace." It is difficult to establish whether the criminal law actu-
ally deters potential criminals from committing crimes. However, there
is some evidence of that effect in so far as it relates to the achievement of
266. Human Development Report 2009: Sierra Leone, U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, http://
hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country-fact-sheets/ctyfs_SLE.html. Sierra Leone has consis-
tently ranked as one of the least developed countries in the world according to the U.N.
Human Development Index. For instance in 2009, it was ranked 180 out of 182 countries
(2009); 177 (2007/2008); 176 (2006); 176 (2005); 176 (2004); 175 (2003); 173 (2002). Id.
267. Cassese, supra note 2, 67 (noting that the extensive length of proceedings under-
mines both the credibility of the Court and its ability to provide defendants with their right to
an expeditious trial. "Excessive deprivation of liberty of persons who are presumed innocent,
although accused of the most atrocious crimes, is intolerable.").
268. S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 14.
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what may be better termed short-term peace in Sierra Leone. The "em-
bers of war" were still burning in Freetown as the Court was being
discussed and the arrangements for its creation were being made.20 On
January 18, 2002, only two days after the legal representatives of the
parties signed the treaty creating the SCSL, President Kabbah officially
270declared the war over.
It stands to reason that some former rebel leaders and combatants
may have been dissuaded from engaging in further violence because of
the anticipated presence of the Court. Indeed, President Kabbah sug-
gested, as far back as June 2000, that merely beginning the process of
creating a special tribunal would "at once send the right signals to the
perpetrators of the violations that they will not continue committing
atrocities with impunity.""' The reality is that the perpetrators did not
seem to engage in further violence once serious plans got underway to
create a penal tribunal. Thus, the SCSL functioned, at least in part, to
dissuade further violence and in that way helped to restore peace. This
has been confirmed by a recent survey of national perceptions about the
contribution of the Court to peace in Sierra Leone.272
That the SCSL took certain influential military and political leaders
out of circulation was thus highly significant.2 ' By arresting and incar-
cerating them, the Court minimized the potential for further hostilities.2 74
This incapacitation role is all the more important given that the decision
to lay down arms was not always supported by some of the combatants
and their leaders.
This is particularly important given that, in the immediate aftermath
of the war, the list of perpetrators effectively constituted an entire army
of 30,000-if one accepts the rather exaggerated number offered by the
Prosecutor.7 1 In any case, by the end of 2002, thousands of RUF com-
269. Nmehielle & Jalloh, Legacy of the SCSL, supra note 33, at 109, 121 (noting the
Court's recognition that ongoing trials proceeded amidst the war and how this context poses a
great challenge to the legacy of the SCSL).
270. His Excellency, Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of the Republic of Si-
erra Leone, Speech at the Ceremony Marking the Conclusion of Disarmament and the
Destruction of Weapons (Jan. 18, 2002). See http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/kabbah-
01 1802.html.
271. Kabbah Letter to UNSC, supra note 3, at 4.
272. MEMUNATU BABY PRATT, NATION-WIDE SURVEY ON PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 8-9 (2007).
273. Joseph Kamara Interview, supra note 263 (describing what the SCSL has done for
peace. The former acting chief prosecutor explained that, without the Special Court, the rebel
groups "would be free to walk the streets of the country's cities and towns with impunity.").
274. Id. (noting that, without having been arrested, Charles Taylor would have been "free
to plan as he wished").
275. Crane, Terrorists, Warlords, and Thugs, supra note 48, at 512.
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batants, many of whom were child soldiers, had been disarmed and de-
mobilized.2 76 Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons as
well as Sierra Leonean refugees scattered throughout West Africa re-
turned home."' Indeed, the former Sierra Leonean Minister of Justice
(Serry Kamal, former defense counsel at the Court) claimed that the
2007 national elections proceeded smoothly in large part because of the
presence of the SCSL in the country.1 The significance of this cannot be
underestimated as it marked the first time since 1967 that power was
peacefully transferred to an opposition party in Sierra Leone.
Though not yet proven empirically, it seems safe to conclude that the
Court played a tremendously important role by helping break down the
remaining will to fight among the unwilling rebels who wanted to con-
tinue the war. It probably also contributed by effectively destroying, or
catalyzing the destruction of, the residual command structure of the RUF
and the AFRC-both of which proved to be criminal organizations that
carried out mass atrocities against innocent civilians during the infamous
Sierra Leonean conflict. 279
D. National Reconciliation?
On the question of whether the SCSL may be said to have contrib-
uted to national reconciliation in Sierra Leone, as the Kabbah
Government and the Security Council hoped,2m the jury is still out. With
276. U.N. Secretary-General, Sixteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, 1 28, 31, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1417 (Dec. 24, 2002) [hereinaf-
ter U.N. Secretary-General, Sixteenth Report] (discussing the demobilization plan, particularly
the 5,037 to 6,845 child combatants registered to receive support, and noting the shift from
"peacekeeping to peace building and from relief to development"). See U.N. Secretary-
General, Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra
Leone, 1 30, 42-43, U.N. Doc. S/2003/321 (Mar. 17, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-
General, Sixteenth Report] (discussing concern for the reintegration of child soldiers and
ex-combatants). See generally CAROL BELLAMY, UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S
CHILDREN: CHILDHOOD UNDER THREAT (2005); CAROL BELLAMY, UNICEF, THE STATE OF
THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 2002: LEADERSHIP (2002).
277. For more discussion of the reintegration of ex-combatants, see U.N. Secretary-
General, Sixteenth Report, supra note 276, 1 19-21; U.N. Secretary-General, Seventeenth
Report, supra note 276, 30-32.
278. SIGALL HOROVITZ, THE DOMAC PROJECT, SIERRA LEONE: INTERACTION BE-
TWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE MASS ATROCITIES 47 (2009),
available at http://www.domac.is/medialdomac/DOMAC3-SH-corr.pdf [hereinafter DOMAC
REPORT].
279. See Prosecutor v. Sesay Appeals Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, 11 13-19
(Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket--CGgVJRfNF7M%3d&tabid
=218; Prosecutor v. Brima Appeals Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Jf 20-21
(Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsBrimaKamaraandKanuAFRCCase/
Appealludgment/tabid/216/Default.aspx.
280. S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 14, pmbl. 17.
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just nine years having elapsed since the official end of the war, it may
well be too early to tell. What is clear is that, from the beginning, per-
ceptions of the Court have been marred by political divisions amongst
Sierra Leoneans. 281Existing divides between the northern and southern
parts of the country may also have been reinforced by the inherently ad-
versarial nature of criminal trials. Furthermore, the limited temporal
jurisdiction of the SCSL (covering only the latter half of the war) meant
that certain prosecutions could only take place with respect to certain
crime bases in major centers like the capital, Freetown. This was to the
detriment of earlier incidents in the rural parts of Sierra Leone.282 This
appeared to reignite age-old rural versus urban rivalries (Freetown vs.
"up country") that go as far back as the colonial period in Sierra
Leone."'
On the other hand, other Sierra Leoneans may argue that the Court
brought much needed value. In particular, locating the SCSL in
Freetown proved to have enormous benefits. As the first modern ad hoc
international tribunal to be located in situ-the place where the atrocities
occurred-it not only offered victims, witnesses, and the general
populace better access to justice,284 but also created the potential for them
to contribute more visibly, more cheaply, and more efficiently to the
proceedings before the Court.285 For example, most of the prosecution
and defense witnesses came from Sierra Leone and therefore did not
need to travel outside the country to testify.
The placement of the SCSL in the country also clearly impacted the
extent of media coverage and public interest and engagement with the
trials.2 " So although it has sometimes being criticized for being
281. DOMAC REPORT, supra note 278, at 45-47 (discussing negative perceptions of the
Court as a foreign entity and noting the local fear that the trials will increase tensions between
the RUF and CDF supporters, and thus, contribute to destabilization).
282. For more on the general skepticism of rural Sierra Leoneans, see Penfold, supra
note 131 (arguing that many persons in rural areas see the SCSL trials as divisive).
283. There is an age old division between the urban and rural inhabitants of Freetown,
Sierra Leone's capital city and relatively most developed area of the country, and rural areas
outside of it. This goes back to the colonial period during which the country, like other British
colonies, was divided into the Protectorate and the Hinterland. Not surprisingly, some people
from Freetown describe everything outside of the city as "up-country," a term that is deemed
to be derogatory as it implies a sense of backwardness associated with the rural areas.
284. Joseph Kamara Interview, supra note 263 (noting public opinion surveys that "show
that the majority of Sierra Leoneans strongly support" the Court and "believe it has made a
difference to their lives and to the country").
285. Cf Bassiouni, supra note 209, at 309-10 (commenting that locating the Chapter VII
tribunals in the country of the conflicts would have lessened costs, promoted a local sense of
justice, and employed more locals).
286. Cf U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of law and Transitional Justice in Conflict
and Post-Conflict Societies, 44, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) (describing how
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inaccessible with its high barbed wire gates and tight military camp style
security,287 the Court contrasts favorably with the experiences of the
ICTY, which sits in The Hague, Netherlands, and ICTR, in Arusha,
Tanzania. Both of the latter are located a considerable distance away
from the populations in whose names they are rendering justice.
Conversely, it could be argued that the goal of bringing "justice
closer to the people" might also have stoked fears about potential de-
stabilization of the country and the region.28 A case in point is that the
governments in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as the leadership of
the SCSL, each requested that the Taylor proceedings-the highest
profile case before the Court-be moved away from the headquarters
in Freetown to The Hague, a distant European venue. Security concerns
arguably made that a better option than holding the trial in Freetown.
This was most unfortunate given the common knowledge that many Si-
erra Leoneans wished to have closer access to the trial.
Similarly, but more troubling from a security point of view, was
Norman's arrest. Not only did the former Sierra Leonean Deputy Minis-
ter's popularity and desire to stay in the public spotlight play into latent
political and ethnic cleavages within the country, the reality was that for-
mer CDF combatant supporters, from whence came his support base,
mostly resided within the confines of Sierra Leone. This raised the specter
of further insecurity arising from the SCSL's location within the country.
The Court is reported to have even taken special security measures to
address a threat of a possible attack by former Norman supporters.2 8 9 The
SCSL's decision to ban contact between Norman and the outside
world-with the exception of his defense attorney2"-further politicized
its work in the eyes of many. It exposed the intense political cleavages in
Sierra Leone. Those, in turn, undermined the prospects for real national
reconciliation; at least in the short to medium term.
Even worse was the tension that arose between the Court and the na-
tional truth commission toward the end of the latter's mandate. Among
other things, its refusal to allow Norman to testify before the truth com-
mission resulted in political fallout and a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of
locally established tribunals can improve interaction with the local population and the accessi-
bility of the proceedings).
287. Timberg, supra note 253.
288. Mark A. Drumbl, Charles Taylor and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, ASIL
INSIGHTs, Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.asil.org/insights06O4l2.cfm.
289. Evenson, supra note 151, at 743 (describing Norman's isolation from outside com-
munication for fourteen days after it was discovered he was prepared to incite civil unrest
amongst his supporters).
290. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, Decision Prohibiting Commu-
nications and Visits (Jan. 20, 2004), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
ZjDCrS 1YcHE%3d&tabid=153.
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the public. Indeed, it is anecdotally reported that even the manner in
which the SCSL handled the request for him to testify was seen as disre-
spectful and perhaps even arrogant. In the end, by gagging Norman,
many people were left with the impression that the Court put its own
interests first and cared little for the impact of its decision on the more
important process of national reconciliation.
Overall, while the SCSL ought to be lauded for the significant and
important contributions to the post-conflict dispensation of justice in
Sierra Leone, the Court's actual and insensitive trials of leaders from the
CDF group had the opposite effect of what its founders may have ex-
pected. It thus appears fair to conclude that it contributed more to the
process of national separation than national reconciliation.
CONCLUSION
Like beauty, the question of whether the SCSL is achieving justice is
in the eye of the beholder. Because Sierra Leone's justice system was
and, still is, so dysfunctional, it cannot serve as a meaningful comparison
to the Court.291 Rather, as an international court, the SCSL should be held
to the higher, if still ideal, international standard.292 Indeed, if one were to
judge how well the Court treated the accused and the defense by the
standards of the Sierra Leone criminal justice system, it would probably
be deemed exemplary, if not perfect in all relevant respects.
Everything was done better: respecting the rights of the accused
upon arrest, advising them of charges, affording them the right to gener-
ally competent counsel, funding to have a defense to challenge the
Prosecution's case, and providing humane conditions under which ac-
cused persons and convicts were held. While denied their liberty, they
were guaranteed three square meals a day, exercise facilities, satellite
television, a library, and access to their families. As detainees, they were
virtually guaranteed freedom from gross indignities such as arbitrary use
of force or torture while in detention-all of which are not unheard of in
291. See Knowles, supra note 121, at 392. But see Karol Boudreaux, The Business of
Reconciliation: Entrepreneurship and Commercial Activity in Post-Conflict Rwanda, EcoN.
AFF., June 2007, at 6, 12 (arguing in favor of Gacaca courts as opposed to the ICTR). Con-
sider also that the use of the death penalty, symbolic in many ways for its lack of protection of
the accused, persists, or did at the time of the related court's creation, in many of the countries
which have international criminal tribunals.
292. See Schomburg, supra note 210, at 2 ("[T]he Secretary-General of the UN empha-
sized the following: 'It is axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect
internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of its
proceedings."').
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national prisons.2 93 In fact, it is only because of the SCSL that the con-
victs were spared the ultimate punishment of death, which still applies in
Sierra Leone.
For this reason, many Sierra Leoneans would probably not
sympathize with any complaints from those that were eventually
prosecuted by the Court. It seems that instead of helping the victims
rebuild their shattered lives, they perceive that the international
community's focus, for the little time it lasted, was wasted on punishing
a few perpetrators of the war.'9 For some, it would be a paradox that a
handful of people found guilty for some of the worst crimes ever
committed live far better lives that the majority of the local population,
including war survivors and amputees, could ever dream of having.295
In sum, this Article has argued that there is a variety of ways in
which the SCSL is achieving justice in Sierra Leone. First, I suggested
that the Court has ensured that punishment is meted out to some of those
deemed to bear the greatest responsibility for the serious atrocities com-
mitted in Sierra Leone. This is no mean feat since a fragile peace and the
specter of further war hung over the country, even as the SCSL was be-
ing negotiated and built in the heart of a mostly dilapidated Freetown.
But this generally positive assessment must be counterbalanced
against the reality that many other alleged middle to high level perpetra-
tors of mass crimes have not faced, and are unlikely to ever face, any
prosecution.29 I uncovered two explanations for this: (1) the deliberately
limited jurisdiction which was driven by the international community's
desire to cut costs and, (2) the extremely conservative interpretation that
the Prosecutor gave to the Court's personal jurisdiction to try those bear-
ing greatest responsibility for what happened in Sierra Leone. In many
ways, we have seen that the Prosecution was apparently worried about
the political acceptability of his legal decisions and that this, in turn,
made him comfortable pursuing only a limited set of cases. That dashed
local expectations, confirming the early fears of U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan during the negotiations for the establishment of the Court.
293. Knowles, supra note 121, at 414-15 (describing how the Defense Office and others
helped to preserve the rights of the accused).
294. The Court expected to prosecute less than thirty-five people, and only actually in-
dicted thirteen. See supra notes 129-135 and accompanying text.
295. For a similar argument, see also Penfold, supra note 131; IRIN, Justice Costs: The
Price of Healing, in JUSTICE FOR A LAWLESS WORLD? RIGHTS AND RECONCILIATION IN A
NEW ERA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Pr. 1, at 23, 24 (2006), http://www.irinnews.org/
InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthld=7&Reportld=59464.
296. See DOMAC REPORT, supra note 278, at 5 (noting that the group of those walking
free includes "fairly senior mid-level commanders who perpetrated some of the war's worst
atrocities").
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The permanent International Criminal Court does not have retroac-
tive jurisdiction over the country's conflict since its statute entered into
force on July 1, 2002-well after the Sierra Leonean war ended. 7 Given
the lack of any serious capacity and willingness on the part of the current
government to prosecute others who are alleged to have carried out
atrocities, partially because of the controversial 1999 Lom6 Accord am-
nesty, it seems that an impunity gap will be left unattended in Sierra
Leone. This will likely undermine the presumed deterrent effect of the
Court, and the perception of its positive contribution to the nation's post-
conflict dispensation.
Second, while I concluded that SCSL trials generally conformed to
international standards of justice, fairness, and due process of law, I have
showed that the lack of stable funding severely hampered the work of the
Court. Crucially, among other areas, the lack of a stable source of funds
manifested itself in the form of limited institutional and budgetary sup-
port for the Defense Office and, more importantly, the defense counsel.
Despite the best efforts of committed and fair-minded judges and other
professionals throughout the institution, there persisted a general if not
gross inequality between the Prosecution and the Defense until the com-
pletion of the Freetown trials. Going forward, the major lesson to be
drawn from the SCSL experience is that international criminal tribunals
should never be forced to rely primarily on voluntary donations to sus-
tain their work; it is a form of cancer that spreads throughout the body
and eventually affects each part of the institution.
Though funding issues regrettably impacted the quality of defense
mounted, it cannot be said to have tarnished the overarching fairness of
the main trials conducted in Freetown to the point of calling them
kangaroo or show trials. That would be a gross exaggeration. In addition,
and importantly, this concern does not arise in the important Taylor case
currently taking place in The Hague. In fact, after serious initial hiccups
which threatened to derail the case in June 2007, that trial has become
the model of fairness in the manner in which the accused and the defense
counsel have been treated by the Court. With the provision of adequate
funding and a carefully selected group of experienced criminal defense
297. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 11(1), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002). Sierra Leone signed the Rome Statute on Octo-
ber 17, 1998, and ratified it on September 15, 2000. UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
STATUS OF THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3 (2010), available
at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume II/Chapter XVIII/XVIII- 10.en.pdf.
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attorneys, it is not surprising that the case has become probably the
smoothest running trial of a former head of state in modem international
criminal tribunal history.
Finally, in terms of whether the SCSL has contributed to the
achievement of peace, as the United Nations and Sierra Leone envi-
sioned when they created it, I have argued that it has-even if this
proposition is hard to prove causally. The analysis also showed that the
Court's contribution to national reconciliation is debatable, to the extent
that it can be assessed this early after the war's end. If anything, the
SCSL appears to have hurt efforts at national reconciliation largely be-
cause of prosecutorial decisions relating to the CDF (Norman) Trial.
This outcome is regrettable given the goals of the founders to help pro-
mote national reconciliation.
The attitude of the Prosecution definitely exacerbated the divisions
in Sierra Leone. This is because of a legally correct but politically blind
insistence on carrying out equal prosecutions against all the parties to the
conflict without regard to their consequences in healing, or worsening,
the raw wounds of an ethnically, emotionally, and politically divided
nation. As the former Chief of Prosecutions at the Court has observed,
prosecutorial discretion ensures a certain amount of independence
though it is "also potentially a source of danger that can impair the right
to a fair trial and the integrity of the whole international criminal justice
system."299
At the end of the day, in order to fulfill the important secondary ob-
jective of using criminal trials to contribute to the achievement of
reconciliation in other post-conflict settings around the world, greater
attention must be paid to national desires in terms of whom to prosecute.
Overall, meaningfully integrating nationals into the processes of decid-
ing who to prosecute is critical to the long-term legacy. Though for some
national involvement might raise the specter that unfairness may result,
it also offers the stronger possibility that national sensibilities could be
better accounted for in prosecutorial decisionmaking long before in-
dictments are issued and the trial processes are completed. Otherwise,
the lesson of Sierra Leone is that, in future situations, the Nuremberg
critique of victor's justice might again resurface in the form of selec-
tive prosecutions-no longer only about which side, but rather whose
298. The assigned counsel representing him are Courtenay Griffiths, Q.C. (Lead Coun-
sel); Terry Munyard (Co-Counsel), and Morris Anyah (Co-Counsel). They are assisted by
James Supuwood, Silas Chekera, and Logan Hambrick.
299. Luc Ctd, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International
Criminal Law, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 162, 165 (2005).
459
460 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 32:395
perception of which side ultimately matters-in the difficult process of
apportioning blame to specific individuals for mass atrocity crimes.
